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MILITARY AFFAIRS

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NAVAL TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Success of Naval Visits Noted

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 May 79 p 2

[Article by Captain 1st Rank G. Savichev]

[Text] Every day ships of the Soviet Navy make visits of friendship to dozens of different countries and everywhere they visit our sailors are met with warm friendship. They manifest the noble qualities characteristic of the Soviet people: internationalism, high culture and a readiness to come to the aid of those in need.

I have impressions which will remain in my memory forever. Years have gone by but it seems that even now I can see beautiful Havana and the thousands of Cubans who had come to meet our detachment of Soviet ships. The missile cruiser "Groznyy," the large antisubmarine ship "Bedovyy," the tender "Tobol" and two submarines moved slowly along many kilometers of coastline filled to overflowing with people. On the decks of the ships the sailors stood in formation and the bands played. "Viva Sovetika!" and "Viva Cuba!" carried across the water in loud outbursts from the shore.

We spent a week in Havana. I shall never forget meeting Fidel Castro Ruz who visited the cruiser "Groznyy" and talked with the crew. I shall never forget the sugar cane harvest which the Soviet sailors took part in. I shall never forget the many meetings with Cubans -- cheerful and filled with revolutionary zeal. They said: we are learning how to build Socialism from you; we are emulating your methods; your internationalism is an example for us.

At that time, of course, I could not imagine that ten years later I would be hearing these same words on the other side of the Atlantic -- in Angola. Not so long ago the antisubmarine cruiser "Minsk" called in Angola. And, although the visit was unofficial, there were many memorable meetings in Luanda between the Soviet sailors and residents and sailors of Angola. At one of these meetings the commander of the Angolan People's Navy,

Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Augustu Alfredu, said:

"Words do not suffice to express our joy on the occasion of this visit by Soviet people to our country. We Angolans are emulating your methods for further advancement along the path to Socialism."

So think all the toilers of the new Angola.

One of the Swedish newspapers once wrote that Russian sailors conquer other peoples not with weapons, but with courtesy, discipline and modesty. And one could also add: with songs and dances. There was not a visit during which residents of the ports where the ships called were not given concerts by our amateur arts ensembles. And they were strictly amateur, not professional performers. Signalmen, missilemen, sonarmen, common sailors in general, who had learned to sing and dance during breaks between watches. But what successes their performances were! One remembers the thunderous ovations the amateur navy artists received in France, in Brazil, in Peru, in Ecuador....

And this is what happened in Mexico City during a visit by the training ship "Borodino" to Mexico. The "Volna" amateur ensemble gave a concert in the capital's park. At first there were not many spectators. Each number was received warmly. The dances and folk songs sung in Spanish were especially successful. The public requested that they be done two or three times each. When the concert ended the vast square was literally overflowing with people. The Mexicans squeezed the hands of the sailors and loudly expressed their thanks. Accompanied by the enraptured audience, the ensemble members made their way to their bus. But there was trouble. While the concert was going on the bus had been hemmed in by passenger cars. There was no way to drive out. The Mexicans began pulling the cars aside by hand to make a way for the bus. The Soviet sailors left the park under loud good wishes from their new-found friends.

We are on board the antisubmarine cruiser "Minsk" which is under way in the area of Mauritius, an island lost in the boundless expanse of the Indian Ocean. Officer V. Mikhaylenko visited Mauritius when the cruiser "Admiral Fokin" called there and now shares his impressions with us:

"The residents of Port Louis, the capital of the state of Mauritius, gave us a very warm welcome. Wherever we were they tried to say something friendly. The sailors from the cruiser "Dmitriy Pozharskiy" were remembered with a particular warmth."

"Why them specifically"?, I asked.

"Why indeed," Mikhaylenko answered. "The crew of the "Dmitriy Pozharskiy" came to the aid of the Mauritians at a difficult time. In February of 1975 Mauritius was struck by a tropical cyclone of terrible force. Hurricane

winds swept electric power posts down like matchsticks and tore roofs from buildings. When the storm died down a horrible sight lay before the residents of Port Louis. The city was without power, without water and without telephone communications. The roads were blocked by debris. And at just this difficult hour the sailors of the cruiser "Dmitriy Pozharskiy" which was cruising not far off the island, came to the rescue. Brigades were quickly formed and organization of the work to be done was thought through. They worked 12 days and restored tens of kilometers of electric power and telephone lines, cleared the roads of debris and put the water supply line back into operation. The sailors gave blood to the Mauritian public health fund. In a telegram addressed to Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev the islanders wrote that the people of Mauritius would always be grateful to the commander and crew of the cruiser "Dmitriy Pozharskiy" for their unselfish assistance."

And now when other Soviet sailors take liberty visits on this island the Mauritians meet them as their own.

On the 'Slavnyy'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 May 79 p 2

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank G. Lyzhenkov, commander of the large missile ship "Slavnyy"]

[Text] We had a seminar of the ship's officers coming up on how to most efficiently organize a long-cruise competition, particularly in tasks and norms, between the combat watches; and on how to most effectively generalize and disseminate advanced methods. To tell the truth, not all facets of the problem were clear to us. Our fleet newspaper, STRAZH BALTIKI [Guard of the Baltic], helped us to find some "starting points" for our discussion. It had, at that time, published materials from a ship that had already sailed the Atlantic and returned to home port not long before our seminar.

The ship's commander, Yu. Albuzov, gave a detailed account in the pages of the newspaper of the experience of organizing a competition on a long cruise. Especially instructive were his accounts of how the struggle to promote competitiveness between the combat watches had gone, how the moral aspects of rivalry had been taken into account, how the evaluation criteria had been improved as scores were totaled and how moral stimuli were used.

The experience of our neighbors enriched our seminar discussion and came in very handy for us at sea where a long mission lay ahead for our crew. By creatively applying the methods and practices pointed out by the fleet newspaper, we found access to a large reserve of improvement in the effectiveness of competition and its teaching role.

The long cruise was also instructive for the "Slavnyy" crew. Our ship was distinguished by an excellent rating at sea.

It is not an exaggeration when I say that our fleet newspaper helped us to attain this success. Its correspondent, Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kostomarov, took part in this cruise of many months from the first to the last day. And we read the newspaper with particular excitement when we had the opportunity to receive it at sea. In almost every issue it published materials about the sailors who were fulfilling their duty far from their Homeland. And on return from sea, taking the example of Yu. Albuzov, I also gave a detailed account in the paper of how our cruise went, what we accomplished of value and by what methods.

I am attracted by materials under many headlines in STRAZH BALTIKI. As I leaf through our newspaper file I say, just as all my colleagues say, "thank you, fleet newspaper."

On the 'Ochakov'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 79 p 1

[Radio report by Senior Lieutenant A. Tkachev]

[Text] Again they tried to cast the pilot line from the "Ochakov" to the "Berezina" but with each attempt the weight, attached with a thin line, fell into the water farther away from the side of the transport. Mooring of the ship neatly on the first approach was not to be. Captain 2nd Rank A. Ryzhenko gave the command "slow astern."

But the timing did not work out. The signalman raised his anemometer overhead. The instrument's blades became invisible from the speed of their rotation.

"Comrade Captain, the wind is at 12."

But the Captain's calculation for the mooring had been based on a wind speed of eight meters per second, as it had been a few minutes before when the "Ochakov" weighed anchor. While she was closing on the "Berezina" the wind speed had increased by an even third. But then on the open sea the situation changes swiftly. Drawing back a half mile away from the "Berezina," the large antisubmarine ship again took a heading to close with her.

The tension builds and it seems that every gaze, without exception, is now fixed on the "Berezina." The signalmen carry on with their duty, no matter what happens on the ship, crisply reporting changes in the situation.

"Airborne target -- off the starboard at 30."

The target is closing rapidly. It is a NATO "Nimrod" naval recon. The jet streaks past off to the side, turns about and begins to orbit some distance away, observing what is taking place under its wing.

Remaining isolated for long periods from their equipped moorages and protected harbors, the ships of the Mediterranean fleet take on stores on the open sea. Rough seas and winds make these operations difficult and often risky. It goes without saying that the ship captains are guided by the demands of safety rules in these operations.

This day the "Ochakov" and the "Berezina" were engaged in a dry stores transfer exercise. It had been mutually decided to also replenish the water reserve to normal level. Weather would permit mooring and transfer operations so Captain 2nd Rank A. Ryzhenko gave the order to weigh anchor without a shadow of a doubt. But suddenly everything had become complicated.

... The distance between the "Ochakov" and the "Berezina" is closing rapidly. More rapidly than it should be. The ship's Captain is forced to alter course two degrees starboard. The "Berezina" is drifting toward us. There are constant reports from the forecabin of the distance. The wind is turning the "Berezina" about just like a giant weathervane. The crew of the "Ochakov" must be on its guard.

Then the momentum stopped. The ships lay close to one another. As if out of a sling, the lead weight in its covering flies out of the powerful hand of the chief boatswain's mate Warrant Officer Yu. Sulimov -- the pilot line was cast over. The mooring line floated up to the side of the "Berezina" as if it were a boa cutting across the swift and turbulent current.

Chief boatswain's mate Warrant Officer Yu. Sulimov stands at the very jackstaff and tersely sounds out his reports:

"Comrade Captain, request permission to pay out the bowline slightly."

"Very well. Stay farther away from it. Who knows what might happen -- it could part."

The Captain's attention is now fixed on the stern which the "Ochakov's" engines are pushing meter by meter toward the "Berezina", overcoming the pressure of the wind being forced out. After several minutes the mooring line is also cast over from the quarter deck. With its capstan winch the "Ochakov" draws itself to the "Berezina."

The sea literally rages between the hulls of the ships. Clusters of air fenders fly up to the very guard rails. Gradually the faces of sailors on the deck of the "Berezina" take on discernible features: you can see smiles.

The capstan has stopped. While the auxiliary lines are being secured the ships' Captains discuss business matters. The "Berezina's" superstructure forms a lee where the transfer can be done without violating safety standards.

Fresh water flowed into the "Ochakov's" tanks. Old acquaintances, having met unexpectedly miles and miles of water from their home shores, lined the rails and exchanged news. But the wind continues to grow stronger. Water spray carries back like a ground blizzard from the bows as they are pounded by the waves.

The exercise has ended but the "Ochakov" does not hasten to cast off. A tactical order has come in -- take on stores for the large missile ship "Smelvy" if the situation permits.

"If the situation permits" is loose wording, but the responsibility of the Captain is utterly concrete. Captain 2nd Rank A. Puzhenko could have, of course, deferred to the complexity of the situation and chosen not to take on stores for the "Smelvy." But who can guarantee that the weather will see fit to permit a transfer of stores tomorrow? Any Captain knows that the most reliable moorage on the open sea is mutual assistance, a readiness to labor in the interest of the common good. And Captain 2nd Rank Puzhenko, ensuring all possible safety measures were taken, remained on the wing of the bridge until the trans-shipment operation was completed.

Several days later the "Ochakov," leading a detachment of Soviet ships, entered a foreign port. Under storm winds of 16 meters per second our ships pulled up to the sea wall without tug assistance, to the amazement of all who saw it and understood the complexity of the maneuver. Thus once again the high level of our sailors' nautical skill was shown. But would such a brilliant docking really have been executed in port if our Captains did not have the experience of the difficult and risky moorings in the Mediterranean?

On an Air Cushion Craft

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 May 79 p 1

[Article by Captain-Lieutenant Eh. Chayka]

[Text] The crew of the air cushion craft commanded by Lieutenant N. Monakhov received an assignment to take an assault party on board and land them in an area occupied by the "enemy."

The lieutenant is nervous. He had been required to solve such problems before under the observation of the sub-unit commander, but today he must

function on his own. And the weather is not going to be in his any favor either: a strong wind is blowing and it has been pouring rain since morning. Will his subordinates be able to get the vessel ready for combat and the voyage in time? After all they can't make any allowances for weather in the performance standards.

While Monakhov was going over the specifics of the mission with the sub-unit commander, the chief of his gas turbine team, Warrant Officer V. Kocherzhanov, and Seaman V. Golobokov warmed up the turbine. Other members of the crew readied the complicated instruments for operation.

It is cramped in the wheelhouse, which resembles an aircraft cockpit. The supercharged air of the turbine began its roar. The vessel slipped smoothly along the shore and soon gently touched the water. A cross wind makes control more difficult but Monakhov steers the vessel steadily along the fairway.

The lieutenant was assigned to the air cushion craft sub-unit little more than a year ago. The complex equipment fascinated the young officer and Monakhov became utterly engrossed in learning all the craft's equipment. Captain-Lieutenant V. Tyutik helped him to master piloting of the craft. Vladimir Fedorovich devoted special attention to developing in the young officer the ability to perform efficiently in any situation.

Once during training Monakhov, having just landed an assault team in an area occupied by the "enemy," immediately began to bring the craft about. But then suddenly a tactical order was received: "turbine is damaged."

At first the lieutenant was perplexed. In this situation the "enemy" could destroy the craft in short order. But then Monakhov made the right decision. He ordered the specialists to get on with repairs. He and the other members of the crew and the assault team camouflaged the craft and set up a perimeter defense. That way "enemy" patrols could not reach the vessel and blow it up. The "breakdown" was quickly corrected after which they landed several more assault teams. At the training critique the sub-unit commander commended M. Monakhov for his resourcefulness.

And now today the commander has for the first time assigned the lieutenant a problem, the resolution of which will require good tactical and specialized training as well as a great degree of self-reliance. Sweeping the crests of the waves beneath its bow, the craft flies swiftly ahead. From time to time the lieutenant casts a glance at his chart and issues a command.

The radar operator keeps careful watch over the situation. They are moving at high speed and he must warn the commander in time of any change in the situation. The radio operator is bent over his transmitter. His staccato, rapid-fire voice sends the commander's regular reports out on the airways.

The chief of the gas turbine team, Warrant Officer V. Kocherpanov, is concentrating. This, the best specialist in the sub-unit, is keeping careful watch over the instrument readings. Fulfilling his socialist obligations, he recently submitted a rationalization proposal to reoutfit one of the consoles. This now allows him to take readings several seconds quicker, which is very important at high rates of speed.

"Prepare to receive the assault team," Monakhov commands as he reduces speed. As the craft is braked a solid ring of water forms around it leaving only the wheelhouse and the upper signal light visible.

Not even a minute passes before the craft is on course to the assigned area with its assault team on board. Monakhov decides to reach the landing site by crossing a low, sandy island located alongside the front edge of the "enemy" defense. We slip smoothly along the ground, which is grown up in brush, and then back on the water. And then there is the "enemy" occupied shore already. Seconds later the assault team has leaped overboard and is advancing in an attack line.

The bold decision of the young officer and the energetic and skillful actions of the whole crew effected a highly efficient resolution of this difficult task. And Lieutenant N. Monakhov passed the most important test of his still short military biography -- the test of self-reliance.

On the 'Minsk'

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 May 79 p 2

[Article by Captain 1st Rank G. Savichev, special correspondent of KRSNAYA ZVEZDA]

[Text] The aircraft stood in the middle of the airfield. The field seemed to reach beyond the horizon. But then the field suddenly reeled over and crept to the side and then a blue strip of ocean was visible. The anti-submarine cruiser "Minsk", whose upper deck is a floating and sometimes unstable airfield, came about to a new heading. Everything was ready for the aircraft to take off. Lieutenant Colonel V. Svitochev, a military pilot first class, once again looked over the numerous instruments carefully and reported to the flight control officer: "Ready for engine start." Through the side window of the cockpit he could see the green field of the deck and the cruiser's massive superstructure, like an impregnable fortress, and overhead the lilac dome of the sky.

"Cleared for engine start," the voice of the flight control officer sounded in his headsets.

Svitochev moved the throttle control lever to its start position and pressed the starter button. A bell rang, then there was silence. The pilot could see by his instruments that the start sequence was progressing normally. And when the new order was received: "Cleared for take-off" -- he moved the throttle lever ahead by a few more steps.

The aircraft trembled as if to shake off the burden of the earth's gravity, the steel joints of its fuselage creaked and it smoothly lifted off the deck. The heavy machine hung there motionlessly in the air as if it were being lifted by invincible super-strong threads.

Then suddenly the engine coughed, gave out a heavy roar to a keen, shrill whistle and the aircraft flared over the deck like lightning and sped away into the boundless blue of the sky.

Did Vyacheslav Svitochev like to be an aviator? Very likely not.

His entry into aviation was accidental. His comrades reported and he reported with them for far company. Only later, after some time, did he become firmly convinced that he had made the right choice. This came, perhaps, after his first flight in a combat aircraft.

That time he took off in a trainer plane with an instructor, Major Georgiy Mikhaylovich Grigor'yan.

After takeoff Grigor'yan gave him a lesson: "Now I'll show you some simple and some complex flying maneuvers." Vyacheslav did not have time to answer before the ground wound up over his head. He saw it off to his left and then off to his right. The plane first pressed Svitochev down into his seat and then tried to throw him out. But, strange as it was, he liked it. He experienced a peculiar spiritual uplift and the exultant roar of the engines played a symphony of victory in his ears.

"Now you take the controls," came the voice of Grigor'yan.

Svitochev went all cold inside.

"Can I do it, Comrade Major?"

As if he had not heard the student's question, the instructor said:

"Bank to the left. That's the way. More sharply. See how well the machine obeys you?"

After landing when Svitochev got out of the cockpit and saw the flight strip with the hot haze swirling over it, he listened to the silence, broken only by the song of a lark, and understood that he had become intimately joined with the sky forever.

But to become a real aviator there was still much to learn, much to study and a mass of difficulties to overcome.... He remembers the day he graduated from flying school to the smallest detail. Firmly grasping Svitochev's hand and proffering his diploma, the chief of the school said:

"Here are you official assignment orders."

"Where to?" asked Vycheslav without understanding.

"To the sky," smiled the general.

The life of an aviator is well known: flights and then debriefings, pre-flight preparations and then back to flying. And that's the way it is day in and day out. It would appear to be monotonous. But, in fact, no two flights are alike, no day repeats the one before. New horizons are always opening for the one who takes off into the blue and each new day brings discovery to the one who is climbing the steps to combat mastery.

Svitochev loved his life, served out of duty and out of honor, never thought of another life for himself and could not, of course, imagine that fate was preparing a sharp turnabout in his flying biography.

He was summoned to the regimental commander.

"Well here is the deal," he began hesitantly, "a kind of revolution is now taking place in the naval air force. New vertical takeoff aircraft are being developed. They will take off from the deck of a ship. Would you like to test yourself in this new pursuit?"

The commander fell silent and then resumed, slicing the air with his hand.

"But this is a tough business; in it everything is new: everything is for the first time.

Thoughts raged through Svitochev's head like a hurricane. First the thought of the sea: what did he have that linked him to the sea? Essentially nothing. It was true that as a child he had lived on Kamchatka near the sea. His father had worked in a fishing collective. With his set nets he had caught salmon, navaga, cod and herring. But that was his father. Vyacheslav had a remoted view of the sea.

Later when he was in flying school he had flown over the sea several times. There are no orienting marks and the sea and sky flow together as one. After making a combat it turn it is impossible to determine which is up and which is down.

He thought of the new equipment. Vertical takeoff. He had only read about it; he had never seen it.

To agree or not? This is not just an idle question. After all it is not a simple matter to change from one aircraft to another. And this one is absolutely all new.

"I agree," Svitochev said after some time.

"Now you think about it," said the regimental commander. "Don't rush into it. Weigh all the pros and cons and consult with your wife."

"My wife also agrees," Svitochev said firmly.

"Are you sure about that"?

"Absolutely, Comrade Lieutenant Colonel. She and I have identical views on life."

"In that case, turn over your duties and be on your way to your new assignment," sighed the commander.

He in no way wanted to reassign this intelligent airman. But then he had been ordered to select the very best.

It was easy to think with the rumble of the train wheels ... I'll get to this new post, fit into the new situation, get familiar with the aircraft and the ship and ... into the sky.

But first there were lectures, formulas and diagrams. The instructor said:

You must calculate, just as a computer does, many different factors: the speed of the ship, your own speed, the chop of the sea, wind direction....

But Svitochev, just as the other pilots, was burning with impatience -- when do we start training on the vertical takeoff aircraft? And then that day did come. Svitochev liked the aircraft on first sight. He was struck by its perfect form and its unorthodox construction: its sharp nose, its sharp wings, its own kind of landing gear, the unusual placement of its engines. The aircraft seemed to be poised for a vertical leap into the sky and then a swift flight into space.

He wanted to sit in the cockpit immediately. Visibility from the cockpit was excellent. It had many new instruments, needles, levers and a mass of indicator lights. Yes, this was a beautiful machine.

And as he was to become convinced later, the history of aviation had never seen such a complex and highly refined piece of equipment.

However, the more complex the equipment the more serious the training must be. It began on the ground. The new instruments and their increased number required increased attention.

The development of new routines began. In addition, he had to seriously apply himself to the study of the theoretical propositions which formed the basis for these new flying machines. Once again textbooks, once again monotonous practice. He would lift off the ground, hover, descend, lift off again, and again hover at low altitude. It all seemed simple but there were many operations to carry out. However, with each training session skills improved and confidence in the new equipment grew. Day by day Svitochev became convinced that the equipment was exceptionally reliable. And his desire became all the more intense -- the desire to be in the air again as soon as possible.

And that too did come. He took the new aircraft off from the deck of a ship. Each new takeoff added to his mastery and brought him joy. The aircraft became more and more subservient to him. He had not made a mistake when he decided to share his fate with both the sky and the sea.

After completing its combat training sortie, the aircraft piloted by Lieutenant Colonel Svitochev was returning to the cruiser. The glassy surface of the sea stretched endlessly below. The sensation of endlessness was made even more acute by the fact that the horizon, usually clearly discernible, was from this altitude washed away. Where is the sea and where is the sky? The naked eye cannot differentiate between them.

For an instant Svitochev felt a hollow loneliness in his soul. But this feeling was short-lived. His headsets clicked and he heard the clear, very familiar voice of his flight control officer, Vasilii Ivanovich Yurov.

"Number three, this is number seven. How do you read"?

"I read you loud and clear," answered Svitochev.

No, he was not alone here in these two grandiose elements. There on the cruiser they were keeping him under careful observation and, with their various types of technical equipment, were vectoring and guiding him in.

Naval fliers have an iron-clad rule: when flying over open water trust your instruments and your instruments alone. Emotions, feelings, impressions and your own eyes can let you down. But still, when Svitochev saw a barely perceptible bright dot in the distance, he could not tear his gaze away from it.

It was the "Minsk." As he drew closer she grew larger in his eyes, taking on her customary mighty outline. Now the yellow spots that are the tugs and the red smears that are the fire-fighting equipment are discernible on the deck.

"Its time to start braking," Svitochev thought. He made the proper switches and the aircraft slowed down sharply and literally froze at the edge of the poopdeck, wide as a city avenue. Then it moved forward a few more meters

and lightly touched down on the deck.

The routine flight was successful. In debriefing Svitochev was given the highest evaluation.

ASW Training Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVFZDA in Russian 15 May 79 p 2

[Article by Captain 1st Rank V. Poshivaylov, fleet staff officer]

[Text] During a training exercise the ship commanded by Captain 3rd Rank F. Solodov received an assignment to seek out an "enemy" submarine which was attempting to penetrate the antisubmarine line. Some time before the crew had solved a similar problem and had won the duel by all indicators in a one-on-one situation. Therefore, nobody doubted its success this time. Moreover, their ship was superior to that of the "enemy" in the combat capabilities of its equipment and weapons.

We will say right away that the submarine did manage to cross the line undetected. At first it was assumed at headquarters that there had been errors of calculation in the route. But analysis showed that the accuracy of the ship's route was high and that all equipment was functioning reliably. Then what was the matter?

Captain 3rd Rank Solodov made his decisions for the duel on the basis of his brilliant success in the previous exercise. Knowing that the "enemy" was weaker in technical equipment, he expected an easy victory. In an unsophisticated manner he decided to act according to the tried and true pattern. It was not difficult to establish the "enemy's" approach to the antisubmarine line. And Solodov calculated its attainable speed under way on its power reserves. The effective range of his ship's sonar station would support execution of the mission. Therefore, Solodov decided to begin his search at the calculated time in the direction from which the "enemy", in all probability, should appear.

Having made what seemed to him to be a very accurate set of calculations, Solodov steered his ship to the designated point. Soon the sonarman detected some kind of target. It was classified as a transport. Since it had appeared at the southern end of the antisubmarine line earlier than the "enemy" could, by the estimates, reach here, Solodov gave the order to maintain the previous heading.

At the calculated point the sonarman carefully searched the area. However, the "enemy" was nowhere to be found. After a lengthy wait the Captain began to rake the ship from side to side -- with no results. Moreover, by the exercise rules the time for the duel had expired.

The Captain of the submarine (at that time Captain 2nd Rank A. Chadovich) had a different frame of mind as he prepared for the duel and its decisions. He saw himself faced with a dangerous and excellently trained "enemy" who also had superiority in equipment and weapons. Winning a victory over him would require a creative approach to the whole matter, innovative tactics, consummate skill and close coordination of the whole crew. Captain 2nd Rank Chadovich decided not to penetrate the line, as it were, "head-on," but to resort to cunning. It was necessary to negate the superiority of the "enemy" and, first of all, approach the line earlier than the ASW [antisubmarine warfare] ship expected. The submarine officer reasoned that he should break through the line not in the center of the defense area, but considerably more seaward where chance targets often appear and their noise might provide cover.

And Captain 2nd Rank Chadovich sought out an opportunity to approach the line several hours ahead of time. In doing this the submariners practiced strict concealment discipline and made a thorough reconnaissance of the sea conditions. They were able to skillfully use the distribution by depth of the temperature layers. Waiting until a chance target appeared, they used its noise for cover and began their penetration. There was no 100 percent guarantee that they would be able to jump through undetected. Therefore, the Captain devised a well-conceived maneuver to be used at the line and gave the order to prepare countermeasures.

The situation was difficult. As a matter of fact, there were indications, albeit unclear, that they had been detected by the "enemy." This demanded restraint, caution and quick analysis of the situation. The most minute error could mean destruction. For as soon as it detected the target the excellently equipped ASW vessel would attack. But now the danger zone is behind. Victory!

At the critique someone contended that the victors had just been lucky, that the ASW crew had committed a gross error in calculation attributable to insufficient training. But one cannot agree with that contention. The duel was played out by a very experienced opponent. Up to that time, Captain 3rd Rank Solodov's crew had almost a unit record in the time they had maintained contact with submerged targets. And in one-on-one situations it had gained well-earned victories more than once.

But on this occasion Captain 3rd Rank Solodov did not allow for the possibility that the submarine captain could creatively use those few minutes, dictated by the inevitable conventions of an exercise, without violating safety rules, navigational concealment or precise control of the vessels by the flagship. The submariners' non-standard tactics took Solodov by surprise.

But then if the ASW crew had not succumbed to the temptation of a quick and easy perfect score they could have gained a victory in this case as well.

To do this, they should not have "hovered" in the area of the line, but should have maneuvered about and listened not only in one direction but over the whole horizon. In particular, when they had detected the transport, the ASW crew could have, by executing a skillful maneuver and using modern methods of acoustical observation, so to speak, "illuminated" the "enemy" submarine. Here we see the consequence of adhering to a stereotyped pattern -- underestimation of the creative potential and military cunning of the "enemy."

The duel described here was the subject of thorough discussion at the exercise critique and later among ship commanders and staff officers. We all recognize that well organized bilateral tactical exercises and one-on-one situations impartially test the true level of skill of both commanders and crews. These exercises demand that captains be creative in their tactics and that they be prepared for the most unexpected situations. In other words, bilateral exercises allow the flagship to create conditions for action by forces in more difficult circumstances, as close as possible to the circumstances of battle with a real enemy. In doing this the opposing sides must not, of course, simply designate actions; they must literally act, freely and innovatively, both striving for victory.

Unfortunately, this is sometimes forgotten. And it happens that without any necessity whatsoever one of the sides receives an obvious advantage. That side is then, simply stated, as if predestined for victory. What is the use in this case of a search, of creativity, of any kind of risk? Once a communications officer working with the ASW forces in an exercise joked: "I see one side of this bilateral exercise very well, but is there really another side"? It is difficult not to agree with him. However, optimum correlation of forces in an exercise cannot, of course, be arrived at simply by the number combatants involved. But still, an obvious imbalance takes away the true instructive value of a battle.

Moreover, the ASW forces "wrote" the tactics for the submariners as they formulated they planned the mission for their exercise. How else, they say, could it be? The submariners can hardly ensure Should it need to be said that the ASW forces won an easy victory. As a result, the effectiveness of the exercise was not sufficiently high.

Taking such mistakes into account, experienced exercise organizers persistently strive to ensure that provisions are made during exercise mission assignment for active opposition by both sides, with comprehensive consideration being given to the peculiar tactics of both submariners and ASW forces.

The role of mission development is illustrated by this example. The plan for one exercise was being developed by submarine and ASW forces together (I represented the ASW side and officer I. Ryabinin the submariners). We each deliberately placed our own forces in the best situation while we limited the "enemy". We were ordered to come to an agreement on development

of the plan and to make it mutually acceptable. This turned out to be difficult. We were unable to come to agreement on the development between ourselves. We had to involve the exercise leaders to establish approximately equal conditions. Success came to one side and then to the other throughout the exercise. In the end, the ASW forces defeated the submariners with an insignificant margin of advantage. But this was a hard-earned victory that required tactical creativity, innovation and decisiveness from both sides. The benefit of such an exercise is beyond question. The tactical maturity of the Captains and the skill of the crews were tested impartially. Thus, both ASW and submarine crews learned much that was new.

Of course, in a given situation it is expeditious to arrange the exercise plan so that, let us say, there is maximum probability that the other side's submarine will be detected. Experienced exercise organizers resort to this only when young ASW crews are being trained. They have the opportunity to develop the basic variants for classifying target contacts, reporting them and including other forces in the search, etc. In these cases the ASW vessels are given maximum freedom in their search while the actions of the submarines are considerably limited.

But, as a rule, our best commanders strive to maintain a realistic correlation of forces in exercise battles, thus making it possible to turn the actual finished training of their seamen into bold and decisive actions. For example, the submariners are given the right to maneuver freely and under cover within a designated area and the ASW ships are to conduct their search with due regard for contemporary requirements. In such cases the ships are evaluated on the basis of the degree of tactical maturity they show in the use of their combat capabilities. And also, if there is some constraint in effect (question of economy, maneuver safety, fulfillment of concrete mission), then a high detection probability is arranged. Then if the submarine is unsuccessful in its penetration attempt, nobody hastens to give it an unsatisfactory evaluation. For that matter, if the commander shows skillful action and tactical maturity and the crew shows good training then they are given a favorable evaluation. And this has a substantial influence on the completion of their combat training requirements. This motivates the opposing forces to more fully utilize their equipment, to approach their tactics creatively, and it facilitates timely isolation of weaknesses in training of both ASW and submarine forces.

As experience shows, an exercise yields maximum benefit when a creative approach is taken to its organization. Only then will banality, oversimplification and inertia be avoided. In return this will give each commander the freedom to search for tactical innovation.

On a Large ASW Ship

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 79 p 1

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank A. Cheremisov, BPK deputy commander for political affairs]

[Text] There were three of them in the ward room: the ship's Captain; the commander of the mine and torpedo division, Captain-Lieutenant V. Suvorin; and the navigation officer, Captain-Lieutenant O. Yevdokimov. Before them lay the chart the navigator had drawn up for the execution of a practice battle and also diagrams of the most instructive attacks, governing documents and handbooks.

The Captain explained the specifics of the upcoming mission. Attack was to be from an antiartillery zip-zag, using not a homing torpedo, which itself seeks out the target, but an unguided torpedo. Any inaccuracy or false move on the part of the Captain, Yevdokimov or Suvorin could mean a miss. The officers understood that none of them had a right to that mistake. After all, how well the crew fulfilled the socialist obligations it had taken on for the year and for the period of this cruise depended to a decisive degree on the results of this firing.

In order to preclude anything unexpected from occurring in BCh-3 (mine and torpedo division), the Captain advised Captain-Lieutenant Suvorin to conduct a drill, incorporating all possible weapon and equipment failures and malfunctions, during transit to the area.

For a long time all the subunits firings had been successful. But at some time long ago a firing nearly ended in failure due to an insidious trivial equipment malfunction. It was saved only by the fact that the firing distance was not great. The torpedo crew is now being drilled with that mistake in mind. Suvorin fills his tactical problems with the most unexpected malfunctions, each more complicated than the one before.

Captain-Lieutenant Suvorin graduated from the academy two years ago. He possesses a broad scope of tactical experience and an in-depth knowledge of weaponry. The Captain-Lieutenant has an innovative method for torpedo attack on submarines to his creative credit. Together with the ship's captain he substantiated its effectiveness and proposed it to unit headquarters. Now the experience of this ship is influencing the combat readiness of other crews as well. Nor is this officer lacking in practical experience -- he has three dozen firings to his credit.

Captain-Lieutenant Suvorin has also contributed something new to the process of preparing weapons for battle. Now the seamen prepare the torpedoes before the cruise without the assistance of shore-based specialists. The commander of BCh-3 devotes particular attention to the organization of

competitions among sailors. The swamen now service their equipment in a shorter time. This subunit, which held one of the lowest rankings on the ship in the last training year, is now recognized as the best.

Not long before the firing a heavy fog cloaked the sea to the very horizon. It rapidly grew heavier and thicker, obscuring the "enemy" vessel from view. But in the interest of ensuring the element of surprise the ASW crew was using its radar very carefully, and now this made the search more difficult.

It was more difficult for the navigation officer, Captain-Lieutenant Yevdokimov, than for any one of the officer crew. The Captain had turned down his request to use the radar in active mode, considering it a mistake to give the "enemy" a chance to detect him before the attack.

Meanwhile the ships were drawing closer as if groping their way through the fog. Finally the radar was turned on and the whole navigation post crew were convinced of the skill of the navigation officer -- he had guided the ship to a position favorable in relation to the "enemy." The "enemy" opened up his artillery. This meant that they could not draw closer on a direct heading. The large ASW ship now headed for the target on a zig-zag course. Yevdokimov skillfully chose a heading that would bring the ship out of the barrage. Under these tense circumstances he was able to correctly calculate and fix the position of the salvo. And Captain-Lieutenant Suvorin reported the lead angle to the Captain. Suvorin and Yevdokimov understood each other at a glance -- the practical result of an initiative made by the ship's Captain was now showing up. Long before the firing he had proposed to these two officers that they "cross-train" into each other's specialties. To the degree necessary Suvorin had learned the duties of navigation officer during firings. Yevdokimov in turn learned the duties of RCh-3 commander on combat runs and the set-up of equipment and weapons.

Then the Captain gave the order for a torpedo salvo. The navigation officer ran to the wing of the bridge to see the torpedo on its way into the deep.

Some time later in the ship's main command post the Captain, Suvorin and Yevdokimov intently examined an overlay of the maneuvers and a diagram of the battle. The intricate lines converged on a point of the direct hit, forming a so-called torpedo triangle. And this ordinary geometric figure reflected the harmonious actions of the officers, their consummate skill and will to win.

Housing Deficiencies Noted

Moscow KPRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 79 p 2

[Letter to the editor from Lieutenant V. Gromak, Rear Admiral Northern Fleet]

[Text] When the act transferring a building over to its users is signed on 31 December that means that the builders have, albeit at the last minute, managed to fulfill their plan. But it does not always mean that the building itself ... is actually finished. At least the barracks that the submariners of our unit had awaited to replace their old one, although it was considered finished and ready for use on 31 December 1977, was still being built for four more months. Or, as it is the custom to say from time to time, the builders spent four months correcting their imperfections. In May of last year the building was finally opened for occupancy.

The submariners were happy and set about putting the place in order. Then came fall, and soon after the early arctic winter. Blizzards raged, freezing weather struck and not a trace of happiness was left. Snow forced its way through the poorly sealed windows and only every other heating battery put out any heat. On the top floor several of them burst. Everyone had a lot to endure. Only the first floor did not complain. Our unit headquarters was supposed to be located there, but because of the builders' unfinished work these rooms were still empty.

The submariners could train to save a ship without ever leaving the barracks. Floods came one after another. Twice the power distribution panel was put out of commission and electric wires burned more than once.

The new building brought trouble to the whole unit. The chief of the political section saw to it that an authoritative commission became involved. It was replaced by another, this time headed by the fleet deputy commander for construction. The commander of the construction unit, Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers V. Dmitruk, was ordered to repair the building immediately. A special group, under command of Senior Lieutenant of Engineers V. Prokof'yev, began work at the end of January of this year. They set the fastest possible work pace, promising to finish by mid-February what had been started.

To the surprise of everyone, they went to work in full swing on the finish work. But as for the inoperative heating and plumbing systems -- well that was not to be done. Attempts to reason with the builders were futile. Officer V. Dmitruk simply paid no attention to the advice he was given. They had not even finished the last stroke of the brush when water came gushing out of the newly ruptured radiators overhead.

Our submariners had every reason to envy the imperturbation of the builders. Once again they dried out their rooms with electric heaters and began to wax the place. But then the plaster started falling off the walls. And once again, no matter what, the builders set about "completing" the finish.

The promised repair completion dates had long since passed but the end was not in sight. The Colonel of Engineers A. Sapunov came to the building. He ordered his subordinates to immediately repair the heating system and to turn it over to the KEhCh [billeting unit] in operating condition. But even after this interference nothing changed.

At the insistence of the chief of the political section another commission came. Major N. Pas'ko and Captain 3rd Rank F. Bratkov, after inspecting the heating system along with representatives of the unit, drew up an official statement on the project, pointing out the deficiencies noted. In reproduction much of the statement disappeared, including the names of local members of the commission who had an especially implacable attitude toward red tape and eyewash. In a word, the "cart" thus never moved from its spot. Moreover spring is now at its height and the heating will soon be turned off. But then in the fall with the approach of the cold season probably others will be coming to investigate.

School Admission Announcement

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 79 p 4

[Excerpts] The Lomonosov Nautical College of the Navy announces admission to the first course for 1979.

The college prepares specialists with secondary specialist education for service in command positions on support vessels of the Navy.

Admission is on the basis of secondary education in the following specialties: vessel handler technician, vessel mechanic technician, radio technician; and also on the basis of 8-year industrial apprenticeship with no less than one year in the following specialty: vessel handler technician, with marine engine operator's license.

Term of study: on the basis of secondary education -- 3 years 4 months; on the basis of 8-year education -- 4 years 4 months.

The college admits youth 17 years of age and older who are physically fit for service in the Navy.

Admission examinations will be given from 1 through 10 Augusts on the Russian language and literature -- essay (for those entering on basis of 8-year education -- dictation) and mathematics (oral).

Graduates of the college will be awarded an all-union level diploma of secondary technical education.

Address of the college: 188510. Lomonosov, Leningradskaya Oblast, Ulitsa Krasnogo Flota, D. 18/48. Admission Commission.

Torpedo Support Facility Operations

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 May 79 p 1

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank A. Zlydnev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red-Banner Pacific Fleet]

[Text] The torpedo, suspended from the telfer hook on a wide canvas belt, floats smoothly through the shop. Warrant Officer N. Kubenko tenderly caresses its dark green side, smiling with satisfaction. The crews under his command have once again labored on conscience and prepared the torpedo quickly and well. Not much time will pass before the submariners who take this weapon on board will confirm this with a direct hit. So it has been many times, because the specialists of this shore-based subunit know their business exceedingly well and are unaccustomed to complaints. After all it is no accident that many of the combat stations fly pennants which read: "For Excellent Quality Weapons Preparation." It is not simple to win the award of this honor: it is not easy to win a socialist competition in which the emphasis in scoring is on work quality. But the subordinates of Warrant Officer N. Kubenko can do it.

The crews headed by Chief Petty Officer S. Fidusenko and Petty Officer 1st Class Ye. Tregubov have also become owners of these honorary pennants. When Captain 3rd Rank P. Kosmortov and I arrived at the work stations of these outstanding petty officers they were putting the next torpedo "into condition." Outwardly their work appeared unhurried, but coordinated and accurate.

The officer had brought the petty officers some good news. A report had been received from the sea of some submarines that had successfully carried out a difficult firing mission. The torpedoes which destroyed the targets were prepared by the very crews of S. Fidusenko and Ye. Tregubov. Captain 3rd Rank P. Kosmortov warmly congratulated the seamen on their recurrent victory. Such is the established practice here. Cruise reports are brought to the prompt attention of those who passed the torpedoes on to the submarines, thereby guaranteeing excellent quality in their preparation.

"Victory at Sea is Forged on the Shore!" So it is written in the unit's established rules for the torpedoman's combat work. Each time new replacements come in the newcomers are sworn to loyalty to their profession. This ritual is ceremonial and moving and it ends with each new seaman planting a small tree that he will continue to care for until the end of his service. The newcomers are assisted in planting the seedlings by the torpedomen they are replacing.

A small well-groomed birch lane has already grown up on this former vacant land. Seamen go into the reserve leaving behind memories of themselves, the trees they have planted and their exemplary service. Many do not leave the Navy but return to their home collective and their beloved profession as warrant officers. This is just what Komsomol member N. Kubenko and Communists A. Dautov and M. Shakhvorostov did. They are all highly classed specialists and skillful teachers of their subordinates. Their example is the model for everyone.

Now at the beginning of the summer combat exercise, combat enthusiasm has grown in the subunit.

Here is the section that prepares the torpedo guidance instruments. There is ideal cleanliness and order in the facility. Seamen and petty officers "work magic" over the delicate, clever devices. The acting chief, Warrant Officer V. Belous, consults first with one then another of the specialists.

The instrument men have, as a rule, no pretensions. We learned about the fact that they are leading the exercise competition from a colorful display screen which graphically depicts the fulfillment of obligations. Here one's attention is drawn to photographs of seamen -- competition winners for each week and month. Among the elite is the secretary of the subunit's Komsomol organization, first class specialist Petty Officer 2nd Class V. Gorlov. In the opinion of the warrant officer this petty officer has the potential to become the best torpedoman in the subunit -- and then his photograph will be moved to a special stand.

By the way, the competition display reflects not only successes. Objectivity and openness dictate that a place be found here for those who are lagging behind as well. Herein lies the strength of the collective -- that even the smallest deviation from the established order or the slightest carelessness draws severe censure on principle. On the screen we saw words of criticism directed at Seaman V. Yakimenko. Alongside the screen Warrant Officer V. Belous tells us that this seaman had made a blunder but is now proceeding at high speed. He was ashamed to see his picture among the laggards. The chart showing the specialists' combat work is no less striking. It shows who prepared a given torpedo and how it performed in the deep. If it was faultless then a red circle is placed by the name of the crew commander. If even the slightest complaint was made, he gets a yellow circle. The color of red predominates. But if there are yellow marks they are dated to show that at that time the personnel had not yet joined the struggle for the best rating in the fleet. The seamen are filled with resolve to achieve that status during the summer training period.

Loaded with torpedoes, the dollies roll softly along the concrete strip past the young birches planted by the seamen. The strip leads directly to the piers from which the submarines depart for the sea. As they go out they carry in their steel compartments torpedoes, formidable and prepared to hit their mark without fail.

Diver Experiments in Arctic

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 May 79 p 2

[Text] In the morning it is easy to mistake the northern sun for the moon, it is so faded and cold. Our small ship moves along the steep shore that somewhere on the horizon leads into a bay. To the left is the sea which turns into ice. And the ice extends from here probably all the pole. The surroundings are desolate and quiet. The ship slows its headway. We have arrived at the required "point."

Under the keel lies dozens of meters of icy water where, without a special suit, a man could survive only a few minutes. But on deck seamen are now being prepared to spend time under the water that will be measured in hours. They are divers. Today they are not searching for explosive devices, nor are they on an emergency or rescue mission; they are simply training. But then there is little to it that is simple. In these training exercises they are mastering those problems that they may encounter in real situations. The training director is Captain-Lieutenant V. Komarov. He has crossed many miles of water in his days at sea. Each of them is a whole book of experience. After all, for those working under the water every meter counts; every new meter of depth is always unique, unexpected and sometimes dangerous. In such situations the diver knows that he is not alone. His comrades topside are always at the ready to provide counsel and are suited up for an emergency assistance dive. And there is a physiological doctor, Senior Lieutenant of Medical Services Viktor Vertelkin, among them.

The doctor is obliged to instruct the seamen, watch over their physical condition and render medical assistance when necessary. These are his service duties. But then Vertelkin has himself broadened the scope of his responsibilities. For three years he has been conducting scientific research work related to increasing the work efficiency of divers in the deep.

It would appear that much has already been well learned. The work of divers is already strictly regulated and scheduled on the basis of what are called in medicine valid methods. But the fact of the matter is that all these rules presuppose that the diver is working in temperate waters. So the officer decided to develop, on the basis of experimental data, supplementary recommendations that take severe northern conditions in account.

Much has already been done in these three years. Permissible time limits for divers to remain at various depths of the Barents Sea have been established. Recommendations for orientation under water have been supplemented to account for the decreased light of arctic winters. Taking their individual peculiarities into account, Vertelkin has developed several sets of special drills for the seamen. The officer is also investigating ways to perfect the divers' psychological preparation for dives.

Now before the dive the doctor is giving some words of advice to two young divers, Senior Seamen V. Gukov and V. Kol'tsov. This will be their first dive and therefore they will be accompanied by senior comrades.

"Never get nervous, even if you don't understand something. The commands will be given to you and to your partners at the same time. Watch their actions and this "prompting" will take care of it...."

The seamen smile. Now the advice becomes more serious.

"In "emergency" situations do not make hurried decisions. Remember that your every step must be well thought out."

An experienced diver, Senior Seaman V. Peshekhodov, is preparing to dive with Gukov. Their comrades dress them with care. And soon light green bubbles are boiling from the dark water alongside the ship. Captain-Lieutenant V. Komarov gives the commands. They are relayed by Senior Seaman S. Bessarab. There in the depths divers are learning to walk, divers who may very soon have to render assistance to ships and carry out especially difficult missions.

The divers have doubles topside -- control group divers Seamen V. Kashintsev and M. Sil'chenkov. Senior Lieutenant of Medical Services Vertelkin watches their condition carefully.

The ship's captain willingly works with this medic who is taken with his scientific work. He likes Vertelkin's persistence and his approach to duty. The captain provided him with space for a laboratory and, as the weekly activity plans are developed, he takes the medical experiment schedule under consideration.

The sun made a semicircle in the sky, inspecting our ship from all sides. The work continued. The experiments went on.

Amphibious Landing Exercise

Moscow KPRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 May 79 p 1

[Article by Captain V. Poluyanov, Red-Banner Pacific Fleet]

[Text] At a decisive moment in the battle the helicopter crews were faced with landing a marine assault team. The detachment commander, first class pilot Captain Vyacheslav Merzlyakov, was designated group leader. An experienced air fighter and a member of the squadron's party bureau, he is also well known in the unit as a skilled organizer of competitions. The crew that he commands has flown nothing but highly rated combat missions this year.

The marines took their places in the helicopters on a small spot in the tundra, well hidden from the eyes of the "enemy." They flew for some time over a meandering river at low altitude. As the helicopters flew toward the shoreline the weather took a drastic change for the worse. Visibility was reduced. Broken patches of fog crept over the sea. The sun was hidden in a gray haze that blanketed the whole sky. It is hard enough to pilot a rotary-winged aircraft in such conditions, but they had to hurry too -- the success of a well-conceived operation depended on the timeliness of this assault force landing.

All crews are functioning like clockwork. But perhaps the greatest burden rests on the shoulders of the pilot-navigator of the lead aircraft, Senior Lieutenant M. Gordeyev. While choosing a flight route that will ensure tactical surprise, he keeps a strict account of every second.

The airmen pilot their rotary-winged aircraft with consummate skill. They skillfully maneuver along the coastline between high hills which shield them from the watchful eyes of the "enemy" radar. The landing time draws near. Tension of the crews has grown to the limit. Any eventuality now could, as they say, shuffle the whole deck of cards. And, in fact, just then something did happen that placed the whole well-laid plan to land the assault team in jeopardy. As they came over the top of a hill the airmen saw camouflaged "enemy" tanks and armored personnel carriers where nobody had expected to find them.

The helicopters hovered in place for an instant. And that moment was a critical one. They had only to hesitate for an instant longer and the rotary-winged aircraft would have come under destructive fire. But the leader, Captain Merzlyakov, did not lose his head; he acted decisively. He immediately gave a brief command to the trailing aircraft and, forcing maximum power from the engine, made a steep turn to hurl his aircraft to the opposite slope of the hill. Before the "enemy" could understand what was happening the helicopters were hidden beyond the crest of hill and were on the ground with their hatches flung open. It was now up to the marines. They charged in attack and captured the hill that they were to hold until the main forces advanced from the sea. The "enemy" threw up his helicopters to pin the assault force down. A high-speed carousel whirled through the gloomy sky.

They had barely managed to repel this attack from the air when tanks appeared on the crest of the hill, and behind them marines. The tanks were firing as they advanced. Now the helicopters had to move out of the "enemy" fire as soon as possible. Kicking up whirlwinds with their rotors, the helicopters soared upward and, diving into a depression between the hills, headed for the sea.

The daring maneuver of the helicopter crews led by V. Merzlyakov had ensured favorable conditions for the assault force landing and for the continuing offensive.

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 23 May 79 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Yu. Malekin]

[Text] The last brief commands are given, the ship throws its wake astern and lightly touches the pier. The mooring lines are quickly secured and the ladder put in place.

The ship has covered many miles of restless, wind-tossed sea. And every hour of the cruise was filled with intensive combat training. Battle alarms were sounded and tactical problems came one after another. That's the way it always is on a cruise, but this time the crew's every step was evaluated by headquarters officers -- the ship had undergone a recurrent exercise examination.

At first glance everything was normal. The examination had been passed with a rating of good and the crew received the right to go on to more difficult missions. Some showed an attitude of buoyant well-being. They said: we overcame a routine obstacle in a splendid manner. But the secretary of the party organization, Warrant Officer P. Yurov, a respected man on the ship, gave a different evaluation.

"Of course, for some a "good" rating is a success. But I doubt that it is for us," he said.

As the facts testify, this veteran of the ship did not express this thought without cause.

... A cardiogram is taken of a functioning heart. All appears to be normal. But the experienced eye of the doctor suddenly notices a drop in the clean line, a drop imperceptible at first glance. This is an alarm signal. A process has begun which should not be present in a normal heart. The reason for the drop must be found and immediate steps must be taken to eliminate it.

The collective under discussion worked for many years without such a drop. It carried a rating of excellent and was deservedly recognized and decorated more than once. And more than one generation of petty officers and seamen served on board during this time. Just as a baton in a relay race, the warriors passed on a love for their glorious ship and their pride in her successes. All training problems were resolved with high marks and the crew was always known for its high level of skill. The ship's communists set the tenor in socialist competition. They served as models of discipline and determination.

And then somehow imperceptibly composure crept in. Glory, having become routine, gradually bred complacency -- the best can do no wrong. Not immediately, but a sense of immunity to mistakes began to be felt. The ship's many years of merit from time to time caused even the inspectors to look at the crew with a less demanding eye. Although they did write up certain deficiencies and criticized them, they still gave the crew high evaluations.

In good tradition the crew took on the obligation to confirm the ship's excellent rating in this training year. The seamen gave their word during the winter training period to pass the greater part of its problems with the very highest rating. The warriors' individual obligations specified that they would upgrade their qualification class and would be models of discipline and determination.

All this obligated each member of the crew to a lot. But even at the beginning of the winter training period Captain-Lieutenant Engineer V. Kydayev committed a gross error. It seemed that the Captain and the Communists would out of principle demand strict accountability from the violator. But strict punishment would not look pretty on the record of how the crew of an excellent-rated ship fulfilled its obligations. So, as they say, the brakes were put on the matter. Kudayev, hoping that he would be forgiven after all, recently violated discipline still again. But this time the incident was given publicity. The division which this officer commands failed to meet its obligations.

Warrant Officer B. Sokolov did not meet his personal obligations in the winter training period. It is all the more a pity because he began the training year well. Had his colleagues been more exacting day to day, they could have helped him avoid mistakes in his duties. But, unfortunately, his comrades did not deal frankly with the seaman in time.

"Minor" shortcomings and infractions by isolated seamen began to accumulate and to show up in the quality of the combat training. The crew dragged out its preparation up until the first exercise. The seamen spent a lot of time but still received only a good evaluation.

The most important examiner of a crew's combat proficiency is the sea. And so a scheduled cruise was completed, the same cruise with which this discussion began. It showed that the knowledge some seamen had of their functional responsibilities and operational instructions was, alas, less than perfect. The senior officer noted some that were insufficiently prepared among the watch officers. Specifically, Captain-Lieutenant Yu. Luk'yanov was written up. As it later became known, he had not worked as much as he should have to upgrade his qualifications. After all, he had made such a promise in his obligations.

The test of the sea brought out other shortcomings. As a result, the ship, as noted above, received only a good evaluation. But two "goods" in a row could not help but perk up the ears of the crew of an "excellent" ship.

A drop in the rhythm of the collective's combat training is apparent. But the crew has the wherewithal to correct this situation. The collective has many highly qualified specialists -- experts in their field. It is not for the ship's captain to occupy himself with the education of subordinates or organization of competitions in quality resolution of training problems. But the captain, his deputy for political affairs, V. Glushkov, all Communists and Komsomol members on board should examine their work with exacting scrutiny, should be more demanding of themselves and their comrades, should be more persistent in ensuring attainment of goals from the very first day of the summer training period. Only through such an approach will the obligations for the year be met totally by an excellent crew and its combat training regain its former even rhythm.

On the 'Zheuchiv'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 May 79 p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank S. Bystrov]

[Text] The ship's Captain summoned mine officer Captain-Lieutenant Yu. Aken'tiyev and gave him some far-from-pleasant news. The decision had been made to transfer Seaman A. Goryachev, a proven maleficient, to radio technical duties in the mine and torpedo division (BCh-3). "For reeducation, no doubt," the Captain-Lieutenant thought but he said nothing. During his six years as commander of BCh-3 he had, of course, met some less-than-perfect seamen. Still it's not something one gets used to. But just then the officer caught himself already trying to imagine his first conversation with his new subordinate.

Captain-Lieutenant Aken'tiyev remembered Seaman Goryachev well from their last meeting, at a ship-wide Komsomol meeting when the seaman was expelled from the Komsomol organization. And now that same sullen, uncommunicative Goryachev, probably despondent over all that had happened to him, sat before his new commander. Open conversation was not achieved, but Aken'tiyev had not created any illusions on that account. Evidently there had been many such conversations with this sailor, who had been reduced in grade from petty officer to seaman. And all had been futile.

"I am well aware of your transgressions," the officer concluded their talk in a calm, normal voice. "We shall consider that your service to be beginning over again. As you serve so shall we treat you. I am assigning you to the torpedo room, the best section in this division."

"Everything is understood," the seaman said with a barely perceptible show of relief.

Yuriy Igorevich expected Petty Officer 1st Class G. Toma to come running to him. And he did. The torpedo section commander knocked on the door and flung it open. His dark, excited eyes said it all. The officer smiled, anticipating his question.

"Do you not approve of your new man?"

"That is correct, Comrade Captain-Lieutenant. Why send him to us?" The petty officer tried to hold back his agitation. "It would be more understandable if he were a torpedoman, but Goryachev is a sonar man."

"Well to clear up everything, let's talk a bit. Take a seat."

The torpedomen on the large antisubmarine ship "Zhguchiy" had enjoyed a fine reputation for a long time. Headquarters officers brought seamen here from other ships to show them in what exemplary condition weapons can be maintained. Captain-Lieutenant Aken'tiyev well remembers all the petty officers who headed this outstanding section over the years. Just as baton in a relay race they passed their experience, along with an excellent crew rating, on to their successors. Ship's Chief Petty Officer Ya. Kovalchuk had been entered in the unit's Book of Honor and Chief Petty Officer N. Kozachenko was considered one of the best specialists on the ship. As he went into the reserve he had recommended Petty Officer 1st Class Toma to take his place.

"So there, Comrade Toma." Captain-Lieutenant Aken'tiyev always spoke very directly with his subordinate. "What other petty officer can I entrust with this seaman? Do we really want him to leave the Navy as a maleficient"? Possessed with mixed feelings, the petty officer silently crumpled his beret. He was flattered by the trust of his commander and understood that he had no right to refuse. But at that time his hopes of taking a prize-winning place in the upcoming competition for best torpedo crew fell.

The petty officer stood up. His eyes were fixed and his brows came together.

"As you wish, Comrade Captain-Lieutenant. And he will serve with us as he should serve".

The division commander himself showed Seaman Goryachev his new duties.

"There is a lot of work here and it is hard work. The results of it will be visible to the whole crew."

A couple of months went by and then the ship was checked by a headquarters commission. After the check Captain-Lieutenant Aken'tiyev called attention to the example of Seaman A. Goryachev, who had maintained his responsibilities in an excellent manner, and expressed his appreciation to Goryachev before a formation of his personnel. The day before, the officer had consulted with Petty Officer Toma who said that this recognition would be very appropriate -- Goryachev was trying hard.

Goryachev was indeed trying hard. His fellow team members told him without any moral admonition: "whatever place our team takes in the competition depends first of all on you."

The whole division and the whole crew lived for the upcoming competition. Goryachev seemed to be the center of attention. Aken'tiyev tasked up to draw up some agitation posters and the seaman spent all his free time drawing. Then he sent Goryachev into town on an errand alone. He returned without incident, having accomplished everything to the letter. Errand followed errand. The officer was doing this purposely, not to test his subordinate: he trusted him. He did it so the sailor himself could become accustomed to this trust and cease to cut himself off from those around him.

And finally the competition began. The torpedomen -- all three of them -- literally exhausted themselves preparing for it. And they all understood that the weak link in the team was Goryachev. He felt it most acutely of all. No matter how the seaman tried, it is impossible to become a first class torpedoman in a few months. Captain-Lieutenant Aken'tiyev reassured his subordinates but somehow the thought kept coming to him as well -- was it worth it to "burden" this excellent team with Goryachev when he could have given them a trained torpedoman?

The "Zhguchiy" torpedomen passed the first stage of the competition, a check of responsibilities, without any problem. And the main credit for this belong to Goryachev who tirelessly tended the equipment. But then further on, in the combat phase, the principal burden, of course, fell to Toma and Barbarov. They showed the high class of their training and the team went into the finals. There too they overcame their lagging opponents. The sailors were already celebrating a victory, but the division commander frowned. The commission would announce the final results after it had considered a large number of factors taken as a whole: their knowledge and work habits, results of combat exercises for the year and the personal qualities of each specialist. Nobody yet knew how the commission would view Goryachev or whether they would take into consideration how drastically he had changed over these months.

The "Zhguchiy" torpedo team was announced as the best in the unit. Congratulating the sailors on their victory, Aken'tiyev shook hands with each of them. When he came to Goryachev, the latter smiled broadly, probably for the first time in all these months.

"That's something irreparable" the officer thought to himself.

TRAINING IN MOTORIZED RIFLE AND AIRBORNE UNITS

Motorized Rifle Regiment Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 79 p 1

[Article by Gds Lt Col L. Kovalev, commander, motorized rifle regiment: "Measure of Demandingness"]

[Text] The winter period of training was a difficult and busy time for the men of the regiment. The special responsibility on competition initiators obliged us tirelessly to seek out reserve potential for increasing the effectiveness of the training process. Innovative search was conducted on a broad front and promoted high-quality accomplishment of all tasks. Observed and graded exercises conducted in the regiment by officers from Ground Forces Main Combat Training Directorate and the Main Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense were extremely instructive for the unit's officers. For us these exercises were a model of depth of analysis, high-principledness and demandingness.

The regiment completed winter training successfully. Good marks were received in the leading disciplines. Weapons training was rated excellent. Many companies and batteries, platoons, squads, and crews received excellent marks. The inspecting officers had high praise for the high degree of professional performance proficiency of the officers, who skillfully directed their assigned subunits in mock battle and effectively utilized the modern weaponry at their disposal. In short, a fine foundation was established for achieving the year's pledges in competition, further improvement of proficiency in the field and increased combat readiness. One cannot but be proud of this. But it would be a mistake to exaggerate what has been achieved. We did not achieve all our goals in the first half of the training year. Some performance reserve potential remains unutilized.

In my opinion a great deal in competition depends on the ability to appraise critically, with the tough measuring stick of combat, the results of one's labor. At times we were not sufficiently strict in our evaluations. This applies not only to the young platoon leaders and company commanders.

Regimental headquarters, for example, was not disturbed by organization of training classes in driving infantry combat vehicles and firing weapons from these vehicles. The battalion commanders and headquarters personnel who were monitoring the course of the training process reported successful performance on training topic items and development of skills as scheduled. Then the unexpected occurred: an inspection by higher headquarters, conducted following several weeks of training activities, refuted our complacent conclusions. Many driver-mechanics and operator-gunners were unable successfully to complete the exercise and failed to confirm the high marks appearing in the records. This was a good object lesson for the regimental staff. If internal regimental monitoring and verification is shallow and ineffective, there can be no genuine competition supervision.

A serious discussion was held at headquarters and the directorate party organization. Monitoring of quality of training activities became more rigorous. Gds Capt Yu. Gerasimov, Gds Lt B. Chernyy and several other officers who had unnecessarily relaxed their demands in preparing for training activities were severely reprimanded. Particular attention was focused on ensuring competitiveness in working on combat training tasks and performance standards. The regimental methods council, considering the lessons learned from the inspection, began more vigorously publicizing and adopting in a practical manner the recommendations elaborated by specialists from the Ground Forces Main Combat Training Directorate. A number of instructive demonstration training classes were conducted in the regiment by division headquarters personnel. As a result, at the end of the winter training period personnel achieved high marks in driving and in marksmanship.

Nevertheless it is premature to state that we are fully utilizing the capabilities of the equipment. The effectiveness of training activities was diminished by flaws in the officers' methods training. Modern simulator devices were not being put to best use in the regiment. Some subunit commanders underrated them and preferred "coaching" with live ammunition. Regimental headquarters did not always take a firm position in this matter, and yet practical experience shows that the level of proficiency is determined not by the number of firing exercises conducted, nor by mileage logged by the drivers. To achieve a more efficient combination of all types of training exercises and to adopt advanced methods in practical activities with greater persistence is a task which we must accomplish during the summer training period.

We should like to make special mention of advanced know-how. One need not go far to find it. We are in competition with the regiment under the command of Gds Lt Col Ya. Rybak. At the end of winter training it was determined that our neighbors had achieved more than we had in tactical training. At the regimental exercise they earned a mark of excellent. This means that we can learn from our comrades. Of course our experience will also benefit other units.

The new and advanced is as a rule a result of long search and numerous experiments. Extensive mutual exchange of information shortens and eases the path leading to high end results. In the winter training period quest in the area of weapon training was particularly vigorous in our regiment.

Gds Capt Yu. Makarov and Gds Sr Lt V. Voloshin and R. Galeyev, working in close contact with the district combat training directorate officers, performed useful research. Its purpose was to find simpler methods of determining range to target and figuring various firing corrections, for in combat one cannot utilize firing tables -- time does not allow it. We were able to develop and adopt in a practical manner efficient methods of solving fire problems which could be handled easily by the gunners. Utilization of these methods during inspector-observed firing activities produced positive results.

The search is continuing. We are seeking to coordinate weapon training even more closely with tactics and to develop in the men the ability not only to perform concrete, prior-stipulated exercises but also to solve quickly and intelligently any problem which may arise on the battlefield. The principal objective of our collective search effort is to beat the adversary in opening fire and to hit the target with the first round, missile, burst, at maximum range. We are always ready and willing to share our experience and know-how with our competition comrades.

In particular, during the first days of summer training we shall conduct training methods activities jointly with the neighboring regiment: demonstration classes for platoon leaders, a methods seminar, and a get-together for expert marksmen.

Particular attention has been focused on commander training. In the most recent period of training 70% of training classes with officers were held in the field. Approximately 45% of these were night activities. This has proven effective. An efficient combination of practical and theoretical training activities will also be sought during the summer. Each and every officer will be raising his personal skills to a higher level.

Competitions for the title of best gunner-officer have become traditional in our regiment. The title of winner was won by Gds Sr Lt V. Voloshin. Gds Sr Lt R. Galeyev, who was runner-up, also is an expert marksman on all organic weapons. Headquarters is planning to continue in the future holding regular competitions, determining in the course of these competitions leaders and laggards, as well as synthesizing and disseminating the experience and know-how of top-rated marksmen.

A detailed analysis of the results of winter training and the drawing of lessons from this experience is an inseparable part of preparation for the summer training period and for that stage in competition which winds up the year. The achievements of each man in the regiment were objectively evaluated. Political indoctrination work is focused on inspiring people to even greater zeal in military labor. The party organization works to increase demandingness at every link in the chain of command; it is carrying out a number of measures directed toward implementing the demands of the CPSU Central Committee decree on further improvement of ideological and political indoctrination work.

Only high results which personnel are prepared to confirm in the most unfavorable situation, when performing missions of any degree of complexity, are worthy of confidence and respect. It is from this position that we shall evaluate the results of each and every training activity in the course of summer combat training.

Airborne Battalion Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 May 79 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt O. Oleynik, Red-Banner Transcaucasian Military District, with comment by Lt Gen K. Kurochkin, deputy commander of airborne forces: "Behind 'Aggressor' Lines"]

[Text] Raid.... Behind this dynamic word are swift, high-mobility actions behind "aggressor" lines, a most difficult test for combat troops.

Gds Capt V. Abramov received by radio the order to mount a raid at the moment when the airborne battalion had just completed a difficult combat training mission. Now the paratroopers would be performing another mission: they would proceed to the designated area and destroy an "aggressor" missile battery with its deployed launchers.

Officers bent over the unfolded map: Gds Capt V. Abramov, with executive officer Gds Capt A. Yelantsev and Gds Sr Lt A. Chernov, commander of an attached mortar battery. Many questions arise when organizing such a raid, but the most important item is selection of a route of movement. In the current situation there were two routes to the objective -- along a highway, and along mountain roads. The battalion commander chose the latter. Naturally it was more difficult, but march concealment would be ensured to a greater degree.

The combat vehicles were pushing across rocky hills, penetrating deeper into the mountains. Ahead was the company under the command of Gds Sr Lt S. Kir'yanov and the attached mortar battery. In addition to reconnaissance, the paratroopers had the mission of preventing a surprise "aggressor" attack.

During a raid mission there are unexpected turns of events at every kilometer. Gds Lt V. Sizintsev, who was leading the reconnaissance patrol, suddenly reported sighting an "aggressor" tank column. To continue advancing along that route meant engaging in a protracted battle. The battalion commander realized this fact. The only thing to do was to execute a bypassing movement. But then they received a radio message from Gds Sr Lt S. Kir'yanov: 5 kilometers from the route he had spotted a group of special vehicles and was requesting permission to attack them.

"Go ahead!" Guards Captain Abramov gave the okay to the young officer. This initiative would be quite beneficial. A surprise attack by the company would unquestionably divert the attention of the tank crews. They might hasten off to the assistance of their subunit.

This in fact was the case. The battalion succeeded in passing that dangerous route segment while maintaining concealment. Soon it was joined by the company under the command of Gds Sr Lt S. Kir'yanov, which had succeeded in skillfully disengaging.

However, the paratroopers were soon to be faced with new tests. "Aggressor" helicopter gunships attempted to attack the subunit's march formation. The paratroopers met the attack with fire from all weapons and quickly dispersed to shelter. The antiaircraft gunners did a particularly fine job.

At one point the column's path was blocked by rockslides. Considerable time was required to clear the route. The mountain terrain also made maneuver difficult. A canyon on one side and a steep slope on the other. Guards Captain Abramov nevertheless decided to utilize both variants. He had faith in the excellent off-road capability of the vehicles and the skill of the drivers.

The men and equipment did not let him down. Soon the subunits were again advancing along the main route.

The attack on the "aggressor" missile battery positions was mounted on schedule. Since he did not possess complete information on the missile battery defenses, Guards Captain Abramov decided to employ cunning. He ordered the company under the command of Gds Sr Lt S. Kir'yanov to mount a frontal assault. In the meantime the battalion's main forces moved up a gorge into the flank of the subunit which was defending the battery. The outcome of the battle was decided in minutes.

Reporting by radio that the "aggressor" missile battery had been taken out of action, the battalion commander was assigned a new mission. The raid continued....

At the request of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Lt Gen K. Kurochkin, Deputy Commander of Airborne Forces, commented on the exercise:

Raid actions were extensively employed by airborne subunits during the Great Patriotic War. Penetrating the enemy's dispositions and lines of communication, they killed enemy personnel and destroyed combat equipment, disrupted control and rear services operations, seizing important objectives.

A famous raid was mounted, for example, by a detachment under the command of Maj I. Starchak. Landing behind enemy lines in January 1942, the assault force fought for 16 days, routing several enemy garrisons, blowing up bridges and railroad tracks, and destroying vehicles. Upon completing their mission, they linked up with the 34th Independent Rifle Brigade, which had broken through the battle line.

Capabilities for raid-type actions have increased considerably under present-day conditions. This is due to a sharp increase in the mobility of airborne troops and their increased firepower and striking power.

Even today, however, a raid is a complex operation. Success is ensured only by thorough organization, firm control of the subunits involved, precise coordination of these subunits, as well as resolute and bold actions by all personnel. The airborne battalion under the command of Gds Capt V. Abramov performed its combat missions precisely in this manner. Incidentally, following the exercise he was promoted to the rank of major.

There are many instructive elements in the actions of this subunit. Having accomplished one mission, it immediately was assigned another. A highly dynamic character and continuity of combat actions behind enemy lines is natural. Therefore of particular importance is the ability of commanders quickly to estimate a situation, to make reasonable and rational decisions, and ably to communicate missions to executing personnel. One must have the ability to work on the go, as they say, without losing a single minute.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War and the practical experience of combat training of airborne troops convincingly confirm the necessity for further improvement of raid tactics in the units and subunits. Adequate attention must be focused on the organization and conduct of raids during summer combat training.

In a GSFG Motorized Rifle Regiment

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 May 79 p 2

[Article by Cols V. Nagornyy and A. Sgibnev, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Hilltops Are Taken With a Fight"]

[Text] A disparity between word and deed cannot be tolerated -- states one of the demands of the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." A unity of word and deed should morally permeate all our practical activities, every aspect of our lives.

This is precisely how they interpret this order of the day in the regiment under the command of Gds Lt Col Sergey Prokop'yevich Rogushin.

The setting sun, still radiating considerable heat, illuminated the forest margin, and Guards Lieutenant Colonel Rogushin, halting his vehicle on a broad hill, observed the battalions as they began moving slowly toward him from various directions, as if groping their way. They had just completed a field exercise running several days, at which the tactical situation had changed unusually abruptly, making things tough on the troops involved; the motorized infantrymen had experienced all the problems of modern warfare. The exercise had perhaps incorporated everything today's combat can bring: difficult marches on roads made impassable by the spring thaw, a night counter-attack against a powerful, vigorous and inventive "aggressor," a river-crossing operation, and recovery from a "nuclear" strike.... In short, this exercise had been unusually dynamic.

And now, exhausted by the combat, the motorized riflemen formed up into company columns in a lowland depression as flat as a football field. After assembling, they would move out from the training center to the base where the unit was permanently stationed.

Darkened by the exploding shells and diesel exhaust, the armor plate of the infantry combat vehicles and tanks dully reflected the light of sunset, and this gave the smartly lined-up battalions a stern and manly appearance. Rogushin was pleased that the men and equipment had stood up under the extreme stresses which only mock battle can produce and that the promise made by the men at the rally prior to taking to the field had been fully kept, that a true guardsman's value had been attached to it.

His mind was filled with a rush of recollections. Rogushin had accepted command of the regiment without timidity. The series of command positions and training at the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze had thoroughly prepared him for such a high and responsible post. And perhaps the most important thing he realized upon taking command of the regiment was the party understanding of his place and his role as leader of a large military unit. He was a one-man commander. He was responsible for everything. But this by no means signified that he should rely only on himself and labor apart from the others. No, Sergey Prokop'yevich could not conceive of working without close contacts with the party organization and without the support of his deputy commanders, his staff and service chiefs.

"In my opinion," Rogushin stated with conviction, "sooner or later the commander who has not learned to listen to the opinions of his subordinates and considers it unnecessary to study their needs and requirements will fall from the saddle. After all, what is today's motorized rifle regiment, or a regiment of any arm? It is a powerful mobile unit, hundreds of men, dozens of occupational specialties, and highly complex equipment...."

Waxing enthusiastic, Sergey Prokop'yevich proceeded to enumerate the combat capabilities of a motorized rifle regiment, which is capable of performing a complex aggregate of missions in both the attack and defense. We listened to him, and a thought involuntarily came: in order to stand up under all the trials of modern combat, it is necessary to place skill and ability in the hands of each and every officer and enlisted man, to instill courage in their hearts, and to prepare them not simply to struggle against difficulties but also for vigorous actions on the battlefield, to achieve victory. Here too one cannot get along without a thorough knowledge of life, without an organic unity of the collective.

Party committee secretary Gds Capt Pavel Pavlovich Kosarev once came to his office. His uniform jacket was snugly belted, and his face was slightly sunburned. It was quite evident that he had just returned from the training center. Rogushin always derived pleasure from contact with this officer -- a man of high principles and meticulous in his work, capable of snapping the regiment party organization into action, as they say, of mobilizing party members to perform the main, difficult tasks, proceeding from the necessity of

further increasing combat readiness, stepping up socialist competition, and strengthening military discipline. The party committee had become the most vigorous implementer of the fighting slogan of the day "Not a Single Lagger Alongside." It was precisely thanks to the party committee that a movement for economy and thrift had been initiated here. And at this time Rogushin also was sure that the party committee secretary had dropped in for a good reason.

Kosarev took the proffered chair and impatiently proceeded: "I have news, but it will not be very happy news...."

The party committee secretary pulled some notes and sheets of paper covered with writing from his map case and laid them on the desk. Today he had been present at a weapon training exercise in the 6th Company. The company commander, Gds Sr Lt Aleksandr Lyalikov, had been totally confident about the results of the exercise. But the results were modest at best. The company machinegunners had a rather low percentage of target hits, receiving only a mark of satisfactory.

"Can we count on this mark?" commented Kosarev. "Today the mark is satisfactory, but tomorrow, if some foulup occurs, it could drop to unsatisfactory."

Rogushin also, analyzing each day the results of training activities, had begun noting a certain drop in weapon training performance. Now his apprehensions were being confirmed. He must have his commanders direct more attention to weapon training -- from squad leader to battalion commander. He must remind them of the instructions from the Minister of Defense, that the men must master their weapons to such an extent that each and every bullet, each and every projectile hits the target, destroying the adversary on the first round fired.

"Well," Rogushin summed up the conversation, "let's the two of us think about how the situation can be corrected."

Many measures were subsequently implemented in a persistent manner -- party meetings in the battalions, which mobilized Communists to exemplary performance in weapon training, a marksmanship conference in the regiment, and special quiz games in the subunits, competitions to be named the top marksman.... Rogushin took upon himself one of the most laborious tasks: conduct of a demonstration class for the battalion commanders.

At one time Sergey Prokop'yevich had commanded a battalion and was well aware of the fact that the battalion commander is one of the principal organizers of the training and indoctrination process. It is precisely the battalion commander who has the deciding say in training various specialists. For this reason Rogushin, once he became a regimental commander, just as regulations require, never slighted the task of training battalion commanders.

But let us return to the demonstration class. Rogushin decided to hold it with the equipment of the excellent-rated company under the command of Gds Sr Lt Vladimir Korablev. Although he was a gunnery expert, the regimental commander

nevertheless gave himself a preliminary briefing on the latest methodology from newspapers and magazines, synthesized the know-how of the top marksmen, and presented all this in concentrated form to his demanding audience. In the field he organized several training "points," which ensured a maximum work load on all specialists. The men were supervised by thoroughly-instructed officers and NCO's. When moving from one location to the next, each trainee would work in sequence on the various elements of preparing for an accurate shot. A live-fire exercise culminated this well-conceived aggregate of drills. Rogushin graphically demonstrated to them all the opportunities contained in each and every minute of training and showed them where one should look for reserve potential for increasing the effectiveness of training activities as well as the importance of the individualized approach in training expert marksmen.

Here is one more detail. The regimental commander also provided for an exchange of views. The men animatedly discussed the advantages of various methodological devices and the degree to which they were applicable under the concrete conditions of a given subunit.

Later many methods recommendations and many new items of advanced know-how were adopted by company commanders, platoon and squad leaders. Guards Lieutenant Colonel Rogushin personally supervised this entire process.

Let us become acquainted with the regiment's performance results, which reflect its degree of combat readiness. One's attention is immediately drawn by the following: all subunits in the regiment are uniformly well trained and prepared. Of course there are those among them which set the pace in competition, whose experience is constantly occupying the center of attention of the unit commander and the entire collective. These include, for example, the excellent-rated subunits under the command of Gds Capt Viktor Ptushko, Gds Sr Lts Aleksandr Lizichev and Ivan Stymkovskiy. However, the guards motorized rifle regiment is also strong from the fact that all its battalions are well prepared to fight a highly-dynamic and highly-mobile engagement.

"We are pleased," stated the regimental commander, "that competition is boosting the overall level of combat and political training and is advancing more and more new heroes of the day."

At this point he disclosed for us a little "secret." For several years now the 2nd Battalion has been under the command of Gds Maj Ivan Gritsak, an officer who loves his job. Gds Capts Viktor Oleynik and Vladimir Balashov served at different times as executive officer. There was much for them to learn from Ivan Yefimovich. Now these officers are in command of battalions -- the 1st and 3d. And it is quite natural and logical that the pupils have now surpassed their teacher in some things. Balashov's men are tops in the regiment on the basis of winter training results. But the right-flankers have not advanced far from the others, for they too have done well in competition. This is because the battalion commanders themselves are well trained. Just like the regimental commander, they are experts in the combat

skills. Nevertheless each is stronger than the other in some areas, and Rogushin has not been reticent about utilizing this fact for the common good.

Practical training of personnel suggested to the regimental commander that it is more effective to conduct training of a number of specialists by the system of special group training gatherings. Oleynik was assigned responsibility for the quality of training classes for gunner-operators. Rocket launcher crews began learning the secrets of accurate fire under the supervision of Gritsak. Balashov headed the driver training group. We asked why they had distributed their manpower in precisely that manner. Rogushin readily explained: "You see, each officer has a certain inclination toward deeper knowledge of a certain area of theory and practice of military affairs, and this cannot be ignored...."

Sergey Prokop'yevich spoke animatedly and with great respect about his battalion commanders, the professional qualities of whom he knew to the finest detail. It was for good reason, for example, that he had instructed Vladimir Balashov to supervise the training of drivers. While still at service school he acquired a great liking for armored equipment; he can easily troubleshoot most vehicles. Balashov enthusiastically passes on to his men his love of the equipment. It is not surprising that in the battalion under his command the level of technical proficiency of personnel is especially high.

Gds Maj Vladimir Batayenkov, commander of a tank battalion, has the following to say about the regimental commander: "When I first came to this unit I immediately became aware of a very important feature: the regimental commander gives considerable independence to his officers -- in battlefield decision-making and in organization of socialist competition and the training and indoctrination process."

He told of a recent battalion live-fire tactical exercise, which essentially ended the winter training period. The exercise scenario was tough. In order to gain superiority, an attack could be mounted on the "aggressor" from the left flank. And many felt that this was the preferable alternative. Batayenkov felt that the best opportunity was on the right, and it was here he engaged the support-echelon company under the command of Gds Sr Lt Gennadiy Donskikh. Rogushin approved his decision. The battalion destroyed all "cannon" targets, riddled the other targets with machinegun fire, and received a high mark for accurate fire and bold tactical actions of initiative.

...The regiment has entered the summer period of training in an aggressive mood. The targets and programs of the winter months were fully completed, and many useful lessons were drawn from positive experience. Shortcomings were thoroughly analyzed. The final graded exercise revealed certain deficiencies in weapon training, particularly in machinegunner proficiency. And the company under the command of Gds Sr Lt Vladimir Pushkin did not do an adequate job driving combat vehicles. In summary, there will be plenty to do this summer. These concerns both disturb Sergey Prokop'yevich Rogushin and put him into a party, demanding frame of mind. At a meeting of personnel held a few days back he spoke mostly on unity of word and deed -- this mobilizing Leninist principle with which our party has armed itself.

In a Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 May 79 p 2

[Article by Gds Lt Col Ye. Grechishnikov, executive officer, Leningrad Red-Banner Order of Kutuzov Guards Motorized Rifle Training Regiment imeni Lenin Komsomol: "A Charge of Courage"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" stresses the necessity of further strengthening the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces. It states the task of adding to the glorious traditions of the Army and Navy, service in which constitutes an outstanding school of labor and military training, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship.

Accomplishment of this task demands of commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations further activation of their work, a comprehensive approach to matters of indoctrination, and skilled utilization of the wealth of experience amassed in the units, on naval ships, and at military educational institutions. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will be discussing the experience gained from such work in materials under the following headings: "School of Life, School of Indoctrination"; "Traditions in Our Outfit"; "Under Glory-Covered Banners"; and others.

The graded firing exercise was still in progress. A hundred-voice echo of machinegun and assault rifle bursts reverberated over the firing range like young spring thunderclaps, but it was already obvious to everybody that first place had been won by the "Kirovskiy" platoon under the command of Gds Lt D. Kalenichenko. All his men had completed the exercise with a mark of excellent, and many had hit their targets on the first burst.

The guardsmen's faces beamed, and their eyes sparkled joyously. I had seen them just as happy 6 months back on the day they took the military oath. By tradition the ceremony was held in the top-ranking shop at the famed Kirovskiy Plant in Leningrad, emissaries from which come each spring and fall to serve in our regiment. Witnessed by fellow military personnel, their families and fellow workers, in front of the memorial honoring the Putilov heroes, from whom our unit was formed in 1918, the young soldiers voiced the words of the solemn oath with particular awareness of their meaning, with a particular feeling of responsibility. And now our guardsmen are performing in an exemplary manner, endeavoring not to shame the good name of the Putilov-Kirov workers. The "Kirovskiy" platoon, made up of young workers from that famed plant, is always excellent-rated and a right-flanker in socialist competition. And an important role in achieving this success is played by the solemn ritual of taking the military oath, which has an effect on the soldiers' hearts like a charge of inspiration for their entire term of military service and for their entire civilian life afterwards.

Rituals.... One can scarcely exaggerate their indoctrinational role. This is one of the most moving and memorable moments of military service. Incidentally, personnel discharged into the reserves frequently write about this in letters to their fellow soldiers. And we seek to ensure that rituals always occupy a worthy place in the arsenal of means of ideological-political and military indoctrination of personnel.

What rituals do we employ? There is quite a list. They include initiation as a guardsman and festive ceremonies greeting the young recruits, evening roll calls with calling of the names of heroes permanently maintained on the rolls of subunits, military parades, reviews of military drill songs, placing of wreaths on hero memorials, and others. But of importance here is not so much the quantitative as the qualitative aspect of rituals, their emotional effect on the men. Naturally we seek to ensure that they leave an indelible mark in the hearts of those present.

Taking the military oath -- one of the most festive military rituals -- is preceded in our regiment, for example, by vigorous and comprehensive preparations. We do not limit ourselves merely to text memorization by the young soldiers; we explain in detail the content and significance of each point of the oath, and we acquaint the men with the biographies of heroes who remained faithful to the end to their soldier's oath. At specific-topic evening activities devoted to rituals, we endeavor to reveal the entire depth of their content. An interesting discussion of the history of the military oath was held at one such get-together.

Naturally it would be interesting for the young recruits to learn that the predecessor of the present oath was the "Formula of Solemn Promise," the indoctrinational significance of which was highly regarded by V. I. Lenin, and that he himself, participating on 11 May 1918 in taking the oath in the Grenade Shop at the Mikhel'son Plant, pledged the solemn oath together with the Red Armymen.

We devote many other interesting measures to the military oath, seeking to have it enter the heart of the young soldier, motivating him to carry out his military duty honorably.

The effect of military rituals on personnel depends on many factors. There is plenty of food for thought here for staff officers and members of the party committee. The Communists in our regiment make an effort to ensure that rituals are performed in precise accordance with military regulations and are distinguished by depth of ideological content.

As a rule we perform the ritual of presenting weapons to the young recruits in a solemn atmosphere by the monument to Yan Fabritsius. Combat veterans and former members of the unit are invited to attend the ceremony. They present to the young recruits the weapons which the homeland is entrusting to them. Many young soldiers, for example, have been presented their assault rifles from the hands of Hero of the Soviet Union Timofey Yefimovich Pirogov, who took part in breaking the blockade of Leningrad. The young soldiers

pledged to this veteran that they would become expert marksmen, and they are carrying out their promise. From the very first days of summer combat training they have been persistently studying theory and successfully performing firing drills.

We also still have unresolved problems in utilization of military rituals. Little attention, for example, is devoted to daily rituals, if I may be permitted to use this term. Sometimes the assembly of the daily duty detail is performed without adequate preparation. On an evening walk one does not always hear the soldiers in song, and some personnel fail to salute one another.

What is the reason for this? The fact is that not all commanders understand the indoctrinational role of rituals. They feel that it is not such a bad thing if a company performs the evening walk without song. It happens once, is repeated a second time, and then it suddenly becomes habit.

At party meetings and meetings of the party committee Communists have emphasized time and again that it is necessary vigorously to utilize all forms and means of political, military and moral indoctrination, including military rituals. One senses that this problem concerns the community. Therefore all of us should assume greater responsibility for ensuring that military rituals occupy their proper place in the aggregate of personnel indoctrination measures.

Military rituals are strict and beautiful, and they exert a great moral force. Both the young soldier and the gray-haired general remember them to their dying day. They remember these rituals because they carry a charge of courage and pride in belonging to the glorious defenders of the homeland.

In an Outstanding Airborne Battalion

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 79 p 1

[Article by Gds Warrant Officer V. Ulitin, Komsomol bureau secretary of an excellent-rated paratroop battalion, Red-Banner Transcaucasian Military District: "Not One Lagger Alongside"]

[Text] Paratroopers wearing black camouflage suits had assembled around the central tower, surrounding the vehicle of young gunner-operator Guards Pfc Ilyushin.

"The main thing is to keep calm," stated Gds Sgt S. Ratnikov. "Do it just like in practice!"

The go signal sounded on the tower. The crews disappeared into the hatches. Motors roared into action, and the personnel carriers started off. Within seconds after smoke enveloped the gun on the first combat vehicle we heard the booming of artillery, which was seconded by the mountains in a reverberating echo. Gds Pfc Sergey Ilyushin, about whom we were worried most of all, was also taking part in this live-fire exercise.

We recalled the days when he had just come to our unit from a training subunit. He was very reserved, and criticism cut him to the quick. And he received many rebukes, for at that time Sergey lacked practical working skills in the occupational specialty of gunner-operator, and it was obvious that learning came hard with him.

At that time the Komsomol bureau decided to assign an experienced specialist to Ilyushin. The specialist tried to help him, but he would receive in reply a sullen: "I'll get it for myself...."

But he was not making progress. Ilyushin realized this fact and withdrew even more into his shell. Some people even advised that Ilyushin be transferred to another job, convinced that he would never make a decent specialist.

Days passed, and we soon noted that Ilyushin had become totally indifferent toward his occupational specialty. I then had a talk with Gds Lt P. Anichin, a member of the battalion Komsomol bureau.

"Each individual has a different character and personality," he commented. "Have you noticed that Ilyushin listens to Guards Sergeant Ratnikov more than anybody else?"

It was then that I gave serious thought, perhaps for the first time, to the question of whether we actually knew Ilyushin well. Not his biography, not from a personnel questionnaire, but more deeply, more comprehensively. And not only him alone but the other men as well.

Soon we held Komsomol debates in all company Komsomol organizations, at which the topic of discussion was not just Sergey Il'yushin. The men talked about themselves and their comrades, about their home town or village, and about likes and hobbies. We then got to know many of our fellow soldiers from a new, unfamiliar aspect.

At that time we were making preparations for a Komsomol meeting with the following agenda: "Do not let your comrade fall behind." The question was as follows: how should the Komsomol organization exert influence on the course of combat training? After all, it is no secret that our activities are sometimes occurring some distance to the side of the main focus of daily work. Komsomol members justifiably criticized the bureau and me as secretary, stating that the principal workplace for the activist is in the field, at the firing range, at the training ground, wherever combat skills are being developed.

An unpleasant incident had taken place in our unit not long before this meeting: at an equipment tiedown drill they would not allow Gds Lt V. Sadovnikov's vehicle to be loaded on board the aircraft. It seems that not all the paratroopers had mastered the skill of tying down combat equipment.

This question was of real concern to the Komsomol members. At the recommendation of the company commander, Gds Lt V. Naumov, the company Komsomol bureau secretary, Gds Sgt S. Silkov, prepared a paratrooper combat vehicle

tiedown sequence chart, which specified the strict sequence of performance of each operation, the actions to be performed by each member of the tiedown crew, and typical errors which diminish the quality of combat performance. This procedure sequence chart was subsequently adopted for practical training. Positive results were soon achieved. They were discussed in a "socialist competition bulletin."

The paratrooper combat vehicle study group led by Gds Lt P. Anichin also stepped up its activities. I recall the following incident. After successfully completing a drill, Gds Pfc V. Okladnikov, the best marksman in the battalion, sketched out right there in the sand a diagram of reference points and showed his comrades how he selected a sight setting. The following day, at the next study group session, Guards Lieutenant Anichin asked him to share his knowledge with the young gunner-operators. Okladnikov did not proceed to lecture, but simply took the gunner-operator's position. The combat vehicle was on a "rocking horse." The engine was fired up. Simulation of movement was maximum, except that range to the targets was reduced, but both targets and reference points were genuine. Okladnikov's place was then taken by the young specialists, one by one, and he would point out to them typical mistakes.

"Not a single lagger alongside!" — this motto has long since become for the Komsomol members of our battalion not simply a slogan but a moral standard to follow in the daily life of our collective. Because only common aspirations and a common cause engender the feeling of a unified, strong military family.

Two months after arriving in the unit, Ilyushin had become a totally different person. He constantly felt the deep interest in his military career on the part of his comrades, and now he always gave first thought to his fellow soldiers and how not to let them down.

Puffs of smoke welled up out on the target range. A short burst to range in, and a long burst for effect. While the combat vehicles, sporting their white airborne emblems, were heading back at full speed, we received the news: Ilyushin had hit two targets, and this meant a grade of 4. Thus the next time we could justifiably expect a mark of excellent from him.

It is difficult to pinpoint that moment when a youth becomes a soldier. For Sergey Ilyushin this moment had taken place shortly before he had gone to the firing line. It happened when he became aware of the shoulder of a friend, a shoulder on which he could always rely.

In an SGF Motorized Infantry Regiment

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 June 79 p 1

[Article by Col Ye. Babynin, Southern Group of Forces: "Pennants on the Flag-staffs]

[Text] The motorized rifle company under the command of Sr Lt A. Chereda had demonstrated a high degree of combat proficiency at the field exercise and had

successfully accomplished all tactical missions. At the post-exercise critique the battalion commander commented on the company's precision actions and emphasized that it had expended less fuel than any other company in the regiment.

Last fall, when the movement for fuel economy in every field activity, in driving combat vehicles and at tactical exercises was gaining new momentum in the unit, some officers stated: a laudable goal, but unrealistic. They stated that situations can arise at field exercises in which economy is out of the question. The experience of the excellent-rated company under the command of Sr Lt A. Chereda, however, dispelled all doubts. This subunit saved a total of 350 liters of fuel over the winter period.

A continuous campaign for thrift is being waged in the regiment. For example, when APC drivers go out to practice, they pledge to save, depending on the exercise or drill, from 1.5 to 2 liters of fuel. The search for reserve potential is going on in all areas. In the subunits they are campaigning, for example, for reduced engine operation at idle. During driving practice and at tactical exercises, whenever pauses in the action occur for various reasons, the drivers immediately switch off their engines at the commander's signal. Competition for best driver is being conducted in the regiment, competition which is helping identify specialists who are able, for example, to position their APC correctly in a vehicle pit immediately, without excessive maneuvering, who are able immediately to negotiate a steep slope or swampy stretch of terrain without delay or a second pass. Such competition compels people more thoroughly to study their equipment and more extensively to utilize the rich capabilities engineered into it.

But this, one can say, is the technical side of things. Thrift on the part of drivers will bring little benefit if the officer, taking to the field, begins moving his platoon from one place to another, wavering in determination of the best position. Therefore tactical training of commanders is examined in this unit in a close link with careful utilization of engines and fuel. Let us say that a platoon is to be deployed into an extended line. This is done immediately, quickly, without bustling and fumbling. Such a skill is not easily acquired, and therefore much attention is devoted to battle drill in the subunits, including with the method of dismounted vehicle maneuver training. For example, in the company under the command of Sr Lt A. Chereda, all battle drill activities are performed with excellent quality. As a result his men perform with precision, smoothly, rigorously observing the specified intervals and spacings, without aimless driving around and long formation changes.

A spirit of conscientious attitude toward the equipment is maintained in the units by means of all possible measures. Much work is being done in this direction by the regiment's Communists. Prior to drills and exercises discussions are held on the labor victories of the Soviet people, who have furnished their defenders with first-class combat equipment and everything necessary for training, service and improving combat readiness. The people have invested considerable resources, and they must be conserved -- this thought is emphasized by Communists and Komsomol activists in discussions with personnel.

In our regiment each and every man takes the responsibility of caring for public property. There reigns in our subunits an atmosphere of a thrifty attitude toward state property. Thanks to precise observance of the daily routine in the garrison, electricity consumption has been significantly reduced. Our unit is very strict about consumption of water, which is expensive in this area. For example, prior to being sent to the wash rack, an armored personnel carrier is carefully cleaned of dirt, mud, and dust. The wash rack is a recycling operation: the dirty water is allowed to settle, is treated and then recycled.

...Two pennants decorate the flagstaffs at the entrance to the barracks. One was earned on the basis of combat and political training marks, while the other honors the thriftiest company. Based on the results of this past month, both pennants were raised in honor of the subordinates of Sr Lt A. Chereda. They were the best in marksmanship, performed the best in the field, and saved the most fuel. This fact once again emphasizes the close interlink between the campaign for economy and thrift on the one hand and personnel proficiency and organization of the training process on the other.

Simulators Used for Motorized Rifle Training

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jun 79 p 1

[Article by Lt Col L. Golovnev: "Use Simulators Efficiently"]

[Text] Lt Col Leonid Petrovich Golovnev has been appointed regular correspondent for the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District. We publish below his article on the use of simulators in combat training.

Smoke shell bursts made battlefield observation difficult. But the whitish puffs could not conceal the order of battle of the advancing force. A gust of wind came, and the defending force saw that the "aggressor" had reinforced his right flank with tanks. Taking skillful advantage of the cover provided by irregularities in the terrain, they were moving toward the boundary between platoon strong points. Sr Lt N. Platonov gave orders to destroy these targets. The infantry combat vehicle missile operators peered through their sights. Within seconds flame-trailing antitank missiles were heading toward the advancing "aggressor" tanks.

This instructive combat situation had been created not in the field but in a film-assisted simulator classroom for antitank missile operators in a certain motorized rifle regiment. The training classroom has at its disposal 25 sound films with which various tactical situations can be created on the screen. Stations are designated for the company commander-exercise director and for the platoon leaders, who can assign their men missions and adjust fire.

Other film-assisted simulators are also widely utilized in the regiment, in particular for training infantry combat vehicle drivers. Most of the

officers with whom I spoke stated right out that one can scarcely exaggerate the role of simulators and that they have a great future.

"This constitutes a great reserve potential for improving quality and effectiveness of training, as well as saving fuel, ammunition and engine wear and tear," emphasized the regimental commander.

Amplifying his statement, he cited concrete figures which convincingly demonstrate the great effect, particularly as regards economy and thrift, derived from correct and skillful utilization of simulators. In the winter training period, for example, fuel consumption decreased by 27%, less ammunition was expended, and there was a sharp decrease in wear and tear on weapons and equipment because of extensive utilization of simulators.

Recently the district military council looked into the state of economic work in the units and subunits. It is notable that considerable attention was focused on the employment of simulators. Experience amassed in this area was noted. At the same time it was stated that some commanders underrate simulators. In some units only one third of the potential represented by training devices and simulators is utilized. What are the reasons for this? I asked this question of Gds Maj V. Sedinin, who is in charge of the electronic simulator classroom of a motorized rifle regiment. He explained that simulators have not been completely perfected, frequently break down and, in addition, one cannot make the situation programmed in the simulator more complicated. He claimed that because of this they are suitable only for training specialists in the initial phases.

I also heard similar arguments in other units. One can scarcely acknowledge them to be valid, however. Of course not all simulators have been fully perfected. But even these simulators, with a thoughtful, committed approach to their employment, are capable of being quite effective, as is indicated by the experience of leading units. Thus the reasons for skeptical attitudes toward them lie elsewhere. It is a result of the sluggish force of inertia which some leader personnel display, a result of the habit of using the old methods and a disinclination to become burdened down with concerns connected with the campaign to adopt the new. The consequence of this is poor servicing of simulators and frequent breakdown.

For example, out of nine training positions, Gds Maj V. Sedinin was able to set up and demonstrate in action only two. And yet the classroom is designed for simultaneous drill for the specialists of an entire company. One is also surprised at the very statement of the question of unsuitability of an electronic simulator for training an experienced gunner, for the simulator is designed to prepare trainees for action on the battlefield. With the aid of training devices gunners become accustomed to operating the stabilizer panel and acquire the skills of firing while in movement and standing, at stationary and moving targets, developing automatic responses. Consequently practice sessions on simulators are essential both for the novice and for the experienced tank commander or gunner. Of course the degree of work load and simulator programs should vary.

Some players' failure to appreciate electronic training devices is not as obvious to us. The devices are there, but for display rather than serious work. In a certain subunit we visited a driver training classroom. All electronic devices were in working order. But not a single drill was conducted on them during the summer training period. The men continued to work only with the actual vehicles, although it would be more efficient and less costly to employ film-coupled simulators.

Let us return to the question of the deficiencies of certain simulators. Naturally we are entitled to expect of their manufacturers the highest degree of quality and reliability. And demands in this regard should increase. But I believe it would also be useful to state the matter as follows. It is not difficult to find flaws, to criticize a new piece of hardware and for that reason to reject it. But there is also another way to go, such as that followed by Col V. Voskoboynikov. This officer also found some defects in a factory-built simulator. He suggested specific steps to correct the problem. When these measures were carried out and tests performed, they saw that the time required to train gunners to achieve accurate marksmanship had been reduced severalfold. In short, everything depends on specific individuals and their feeling of responsibility for the assigned task.

It has been correctly stated that simulators have a great future. But it is important that this future not be so far off so that simulators cannot today, during flight training, be effectively utilized in order to increase combat skills.

Training Center Activities Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 79 p 1

[Article by Lt.Col A. Zakharenko, Red-Banner Belorussian Military District: "In Close Contact"]

[Text] When the motorized rifle company under the command of Gds Capt G. Golubovskiy initiated the assault phase, work which was somewhat unusual for the given situation was in progress at the exercise director's command-observation post: they were recording the width of the subunit's attack frontage, rate of movement, and the time of checkpoint passage by tanks and motorized riflemen.... Training center specialist Maj A. Zelenkevich was engaged in this task together with the regimental executive officer.

Regiment headquarters, together with the officers at the training center, decided to determine experimentally, so to say, how to utilize more efficiently the training ground and modern technical training devices in order in the course of tactical drills and exercises maximally to approach actual combat conditions. Prior to reaching the dismount point the motorized riflemen, as planned, proceeded in conformity with the schedule of exercises previously held on that terrain. But then obstacles in the center, heavy smoke obscuration on the left flank and a group of moving targets

simulating an "aggressor" counterattack on the right compelled the advancing troops to seek new alternatives for accomplishing the mission. Guards Captain Golubovskiy was compelled, while continuing to advance, to refine the previously-reached decision, to maneuver men and weapons, and to reestablish disrupted coordination with neighboring units. In short, the result was an interesting and instructive exercise.

Similar cooperation between the regiment's officers and the training center had been done in the winter training period as well and had proved to be very beneficial. Suffice it to say that the regiment is rated excellent in tactical training. In order to consolidate the achieved level and to advance further, it was decided to continue searching for ways to increase the effectiveness of combat training in the summer. Everything of value which had been produced by joint innovative effort is immediately put into practice.

At a demonstration tactical exercise, for example, Gds Maj V. Gubarenko noted that in some parts of the terrain conditions for the subunit to advance were too easy. But even so, the speed capabilities of the tanks and infantry combat vehicles were not being utilized, and some places they were even being held back. Conferring with training center specialists, staff officers suggested additional obstacles in that area. Working jointly, they also reached a number of other decisions promoting development in personnel of the ability to utilize most fully on the battlefield the increased capabilities of modern weapons and equipment, accomplishing tactical missions taking these capabilities into consideration.

Active participation in organization and conduct of tactical exercises demanded additional knowledge by the training center specialists. Training center chief Lt Col I. Gamayunov organized study by his men of combat training programs, gunner and driving training courses, organic weapons and the equipment of the units being supported, as well as the weapons and tactics of the potential adversary. Much was done by political worker Maj G. Pinchuk and other Communists to ensure that this study was productive. At their initiative competition was set up among the specialists for the honor of being the first to receive permission independently to run individual drills or the training process as a whole. The regiment's officers give active assistance to the training center specialists in improving their professional skills.

The intensive summer combat training is picking up momentum day by day. Intensive military activity is in full swing at the training center day and night. Utilizing modern technical devices, the range personnel can do much to ensure that the training process maximally approaches actual combat conditions.

In a Motorized Rifle Battalion

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jun 79 p 1

[Article by Capt B. Polyakov, commander, motorized rifle battalion, Red-Banner Carpathian Military District: "Road To Smooth Coordination"]

[Text] At a tactical exercise with live fire, the motorized rifle company under the command of Sr Lt A. Kudanovskiy was to penetrate the "aggressor's" defense without a halt in attack position and to seize a tactically important objective. Success in accomplishing this complex mission depended in large measure on the smooth coordination of actions by the squads and platoons. The exercise was planned in such a manner that not only the officers and NCOs but also the enlisted men could receive an object lesson on the importance of smooth coordination in personnel actions during the performance of missions under conditions of a highly-dynamic modern combined-arms engagement.

At a critical moment in the attack, the scenario called for the radio in the platoon under the command of Lt V. Tsengel'nik to become disabled. What is required of personnel in such a situation? They must intensify surveillance of the "aggressor," repeat commander signals and commands, endeavor to maintain close contact with one another, and be extremely watchful. But this did not happen. Under conditions of rough terrain, communication between squads was disrupted. This had an immediate effect on the actions of the entire company. In spite of the fact that the percentage of targets destroyed was fairly high, it received a lower mark.

This incident prompted a sharp, frank discussion at a battalion party meeting and officer conference. It was noted that the revealed shortcomings were a result of failure by some officers adequately to appreciate tactical training. Sometimes external effect was emphasized at field exercises. A platoon would deploy with precision from march into combat formation, would swiftly attack, and would maintain spacing in the extended line -- everything would be fine. Particularly if high results in marksmanship were produced.

Battalion headquarters drew the necessary conclusions from this exercise. We now require that in the course of drills and exercises officers and NCOs, with the aid of various scenario instructions, make things difficult for the men, teaching them to perform skillfully in a situation similar to actual combat. Learn what is necessary in war -- this principle defines the character of combat training in the summer training period. Demonstration classes were instructive in this regard.

We also improved individual work, particularly with those commanders who were lagging in methodology. Our best methods specialists did a great deal of work with Lt S. Zhuravnik, Sgts Ya. Kurelyak, S. Parkhomchuk and others. In particular, they had been showing the following shortcomings. In the course of field exercises they would ride hard too closely on their subordinates, preventing them from using their own initiative.

Sr Lts L. Filippov and A. Kulanovskiy, Lts P. Gordiyenko, I. Kas'yanenko and others maintain work notebooks, in which they record conclusions drawn from each and every field exercise, the dynamics of growth in squad tactical proficiency, and typical shortcomings. This makes it possible to work more purposefully on achieving coordination of squads and platoons. The results of recent squad live-fire activities are reassuring. The men under Lt I. Kas'yanenko and D. Kalinin not only demonstrated excellent marksmanship but good tactical proficiency as well.

We must state at the same time that a high degree of coordination has not yet been achieved in all platoons and squads. Some commanders do not show an adequate sense of responsibility toward preparing for and conducting drills and exercises, especially on topics which seem simple at first glance. But the result is that drills and exercises are boring and monotonous, and fail to produce the desired effect. And yet each and every drill and exercise could be conducted in a spirit of competitiveness, with the greatest benefit for the men's proficiency. Lt I. Kas'yanenko and Sgt P. Kuz' and A. Veyser, for example, whenever taking to the field utilize every opportunity to organize competition among the men on assigned tasks and performance standards. They also always draw attention to such items as utilization of natural terrain concealment when moving into the attack, negotiating open, exposed stretches during combat, repelling enemy air attack, and negotiating obstacles.

Also of considerable significance is the fact that, when critiquing exercises, these commanders do not simply report the final result but review with each and every individual where he has performed poorly and what effect this may have had on accomplishment of the overall mission.

In order to achieve a high degree of coordination in the actions of squads, platoons and companies, we make use of the experience of the Great Patriotic War. Personnel are frequently addressed by division veterans, who concentrate attention on concrete combat episodes.

The summer training period, a period of intensive exercises and live-fire activities, offers considerable opportunities for attaining a high degree of coordination in the men's actions. We realize that utilization of these opportunities means raising to a higher level the battalion's combat readiness, as well as an important contribution toward achieving socialist pledges.

Improvement of Field Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jan 79 p 2

[Article by Col B. Kozhevnikov, senior officer, combat training directorate, Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District: "Is the 'Aggressor' Strong?"]

[Text] Advancing to the designated point, the tank-reinforced motorized rifle company under the command of Sr Lt A. Rakov, with artillery and mortar support, attacked an "aggressor" strong point. The night attack would

determine the outcome of the battle. Flare bursts revealed the battle disposition. The picture was quite impressive: smart battle lines of tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and even lines of attacking dismounted motorized riflemen were confidently moving forward. As soon as targets appeared, the tank crews, motorized riflemen and artillerymen would simultaneously hit them with their entire firepower....

What we observed, however, by no means attested to a high degree of company proficiency. The fact is that the opposing "aggressor" force looked rather weak. It appeared to have accepted in advance the role of a vanquished force and did not even make any attempt to hold its positions. As soon as the tanks and extended lines of motorized riflemen reached the cease-fire line the targets were withdrawn, and the attackers covered the remaining ground to the targets unimpeded.

Some adjustments had to be made. The exercise director's assistant in charge of targets, Sr Lt Yu. Khovanov, was assigned new tasks to organize opposition by the "aggressor." The officers of the subunit were given a number of additional scenario changes. Now new pockets of resistance kept appearing before the advancing troops. The effectiveness of the company's fire began to decline, and the pace of the attack slowed. Finding themselves in a situation which actually approached combat, the company commander and the other officers failed to perform in the best possible manner.

Unfortunately such episodes are no rarity in our experience. They convince us again and again how important it is when evaluating the proficiency of subunits to proceed from the demands of modern combat. We might as well admit it: the superficially fine picture you sometimes see at exercises conceals serious deficiencies in the field proficiency of subunits. They indicate unnecessary relaxation of demands in training.

Let us return to the company under the command of Sr Lt A. Rakov. As we know, a company live-fire tactical exercise is one of the most effective forms of testing the combat readiness of personnel. Here the men find themselves in a situation actually approaching that which can occur in actual combat. Such a situation of course does not occur automatically. Such conditions must be created. There is a single principle at work: the more complex the situation which we create at a field exercise, the more instructive it is. In the case we are discussing this rule was not observed.

Analyzing such deficiencies, which are encountered at company live-fire tactical exercises, and unfortunately it is not an infrequent occurrence, one reaches the following conclusion: the reason is primarily that some commanders have not acquired a genuine feeling of responsibility to ensure that the field proficiency of their men is in conformity with the demands of modern warfare. Therefore many unnecessary situation simplifications and relaxations of demands occur in daily training. As was indicated by a thorough study of the state of affairs in the battalion to which this company belongs, the subunits had been training month after month on the same terrain, where

they were now intimately familiar with every knoll and hillock. Duplicating tactical situations at drills and exercises and duplicating simulation of the enemy, commanders have become accustomed to unoriginal patterns of combat and stereotyped solutions to tactical problems. Finding themselves in an unaccustomed situation, they naturally perform poorly, quite differently from performance in an accustomed situation.

I must draw attention to the character of the above-mentioned unnecessary situation simplification and relaxation of demands. As a rule they are connected with failure to realize the value of demonstrating "aggressor" actions. Of course the best school of combat skill, when the trainees are dealing with a vigorously-responding "aggressor," is the bilateral exercise. And bilateral exercises should be held whenever it is warranted and the situation permits. But if a unilateral exercise is held, and this type is most typical for small subunits, one should not forget that such exercises are beneficial only when the "aggressor" is made sufficiently strong and active. Disregard of this requirement as a rule leads to a situation where personnel form an oversimplified or totally incorrect concept of those efforts which must be applied to achieve success in modern combat.

At exercises one frequently notes that a certain commander makes totally no effort continuously to increase his information on the "aggressor." This is a dangerous "sickness." People become so accustomed to dealing in routine training with a weak adversary that, when making critical decisions in mock battle, they frequently fail even to consider the relative strengths of the opposing forces.

I remember asking a battalion commander at a field exercise about the "aggressor" force which he would be attacking. He gave a highly general reply. But can one intelligently organize for combat without detailed knowledge of organization of the subunits of the opposing side, their tactics, the defensive layout, quantity of weapons and performance data on them? Take, for example, such an item as engagement of antitank weapons. We are familiar with today's high density of antitank weapons and the depth of their disposition. One cannot count on success without ensuring reliable neutralization of antitank weapons. Of course the latter can be achieved only with knowledge of the adversary's antitank defense system. This is one of the most important demands on the combined-arms commander as the battle organizer. Consequently more attention must be focused on study of the potential adversary within the commander training system and at field exercises.

Bilateral exercises are typical for the battalion and higher. Considerable experience with such exercises has been amassed in our district. The skills of those officers performing as exercise director are improved, such as the skills of creating a tough, instructive combat situation. We must definitely state, however, that many shortcomings remain in this area.

Bilateral tactical exercises are held more frequently during summer training. We endeavor to hold all live-fire exercises on training grounds with a variable target situation, which makes it possible to diversify tactics and

induces subunit commanders to seek the most effective modes of engaging the adversary.

I recall an exercise conducted with the battalion under the command of Capt A. Mikheyev. The high degree of instructiveness of this exercise was due to the fact that it was conducted in a truly complex tactical situation, creation of which was promoted by a well-conceived overall plan. The "aggressor" was performing with vigor and inventiveness. The very situation demanded of the battalion officers an innovative approach to accomplishment of their assigned missions. They were compelled time and again to refine their decisions and to make new ones in response to the situation.

The situation was characterized by frequent and abrupt changes, which compelled the battalion commander continuously to maneuver his men and weapons. And Captain Mikheyev passed the test with flying colors. The "aggressor" mounted an air attack, knocking out some of the guns and mortars and disrupting communications with the right-flank company. The battalion commander, maintaining the pace of advance, regrouped his weapons and ordered the left-flank company to hit the flank of the counterattacking "aggressor" group and to destroy it. Executing a feinting maneuver, the company accomplished the mission. The battalion continued with the exploitation phase.

Responding to the dynamic exercise situation, the companies were compelled to reposition their combat formations, negotiate barriers and areas of physical destruction, "contaminated" stretches, and to attack dismounted. They successfully accomplished the mission, because the men of the battalion had on numerous occasions previously experienced similar mock combat situations. This battalion's daily training is distinguished by a high degree of intensity and the endeavor by the battalion officers to train their men to fight a vigorous, well-armed adversary. These matters are reflected in party political work, which is conducted in a concrete and purposeful manner.

One can also cite other examples attesting to the fact that the road to success lies through unswerving observance of the fundamental principle of training -- to teach troops what they need to know in war. Summer training provides many examples of an innovative attitude toward designating "aggressor" actions at field exercises. Much still remains to be done in this area, however. To ensure that each and every tactical drill and exercise becomes a genuine school for teaching officers combat skills, a school for leading subunits in combat against a powerful, vigorous, well-equipped adversary means to raise to a qualitatively higher level troop field proficiency and combat readiness.

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ROLE OF MILITARY PARTY AND POLITICAL ORGANS REVIEWED

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[Article by Col Gen G. V. Sredin, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Party's Military Organs"]

[Text] The political organs of the Soviet Army and Navy are the executive party organs of the CPSU in the USSR Armed Forces. They were formed by order of V. I. Lenin and throughout their history have been and remain the party's military organs in the military organization of our state. As was emphasized in the greeting of the CPSU Central Committee on the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, they and the party organizations, cooperating closely with commanders, are working persistently to implement the policy of the Communist Party with respect to bolstering the combat might of the army and navy.¹

The CPSU and its Central Committee show constant concern for strengthening army and navy political organs and improving their activities. Historical experience demonstrates how important this work is for bolstering the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces and the defense capability of our state.

The most fundamental aspect of Soviet military development is the leadership of the Communist Party in the Armed Forces and increasing the role and influence of party organizations on all facets of army and navy life and activities. The need for the party and its Central Committee to direct military development in the country results from the very nature of socialist society and the purpose and character of its army.

In our socialist society the CPSU directs all aspects of social life, including military development. In the decree of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party adopted on 25 December 1918 and entitled "The Policies of the Military Department," it was

emphasized that "The policies of the military department, like those of all other departments and institutions, are managed on the precise basis of the general directives issued by the party in the person of its Central Committee and under its direct control."²

Armed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the Communist Party determines the general prospects for development of society and the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, manages the enormous constructive activity of the entire Soviet people, and gives our struggle for the victory of communism a planned, scientifically sound foundation. The new USSR Constitution says: "The leading and guiding force of Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system and of state and public organizations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."³

CPSU leadership has always been the chief and decisive factor in successful performance of the tasks of Soviet military development. V. I. Lenin wrote: "The building of our army could only be successful when it was done in the spirit of overall Soviet building."⁴

The CPSU attaches special importance to party political work in the Armed Forces and to the activities of military councils, commanders and political agencies, and party and Komsomol organizations to carry out the policies of the Leninist party in the army and navy. The party sees this work above all as a powerful means of insuring strong troop morale, high fighting effectiveness, and constant combat readiness. It is one of the mandatory conditions for achieving victory over the enemy. V. I. Lenin taught that "where political work among the troops is done most carefully, there is no sloppiness in the army. Its order and its spirit are better, and it achieves more victories."⁵

The party Central Committee exercises leadership over party political work in the Soviet Army and Navy through the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, which enjoys the status of a division of the CPSU Central Committee. As an executive party organ the Main Political Directorate bears responsibility for party political work in the army and navy. One of its basic functions is management of political organs and party and Komsomol organizations and maintaining party influence on all aspects of troop life and activities.

A harmonious system of political organs from top to bottom has been established in the army and navy. This system guarantees consistent management of party political work among personnel. There are political directorates in the military districts, groups of forces, air defense districts, and fleets; the lower-ranking army and navy elements and military schools have political branches. Considering the increased scale and broadened missions of party political work and to insure concrete, operational management of party political work, political directorates for the branches of the Armed Forces and political branches for airborne and railroad troops were formed.

The political organs of the Soviet Armed Forces are organized in the spirit of general party building. The principles worked out by the

Communist Party in the process of building a new, socialist type of army — the unity of political and military leadership, correspondence between the structure of army and navy political organs and the organizational structure of the Armed Forces, and the tie with local party bodies — are reflected in their structure and the style, content, and methods of work. The unity of political and military leadership is an expression of the need to solve questions of military development in line with the policies and ideology of the Communist Party and is achieved by having all the chief problems of military development decided by the party Central Committee. Among them are, for example, issues of military doctrine, organizational development, logistics, troop combat training, and ideological and cultural-educational work in the army and navy.

The principle of the unity of political and military leadership presupposes harmonious and coordinated actions by commanders, political organs, staffs and party organizations, and all elements of army and navy collectives to solve the problems of combat and political training and organize the work and everyday life of personnel.

The distinctive thing about the structure of army and navy party organizations is that they are formed and work in conformity with the organizational structure of army and navy forces regardless of the administrative division of the regions where they are located and that they are joined by corresponding political organs. The structure of troop political organs is not linked to administrative-territorial division because the political organs are formed and operate extra-territorially. This feature is in line with the requirements of troop combat readiness.

In their activities the political organs of the Soviet Armed Forces always maintain close contact with local party organs. This is entirely natural. The strength and invincibility of our Armed Forces lies in their unbreakable unity with the people. The principle of close contact between political organs and local party organs is fixed in the party by-laws. The political organs of the Armed Forces take an active part in the work of local party organs. Army communists are chosen as delegates to party congresses and conferences and elected to the central committees of Union republic communist parties and kray, oblast, city, and rayon committees of the party. They take an active part in the work of Soviets of People's Deputies.

Local party organs keep up to date on the primary issues of party political work in the armed forces; the political organs provide them with systematic information on this work. Managers and production leaders speak to the fighting men, participate in party conferences, meetings of the active, and assemblies and seminars for commanders and political workers, and appear in the army and navy press.

The first secretaries of the central committees of the Union republics communist parties and many first secretaries of kray and oblast party

committees are also members of the military councils of the military districts and fleets and participate directly in deciding many questions of the activities of army and navy forces. The close ties established between the personnel of military units and local party and Soviet organizations and collectives of workers have a good effect on troop indoctrination and promote mutual enrichment with know-how in political and moral indoctrination of the masses. The results of the labor of Soviet people in development of the economy, science, and culture bolster the might of the army and navy. Soviet fighting men, in their turn, participate in certain important national economic jobs and in military-patriotic indoctrination of working people, especially young people. Constant, close contacts between political organs and local party organs promote the unity of the army and the people and an increase in the fighting effectiveness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Army and navy political organs work hard to improve party political work. The comprehensive approach to ideological indoctrination problems and long-range planning, in which the challenges of further improvement in ideological and organizational activity are taken into account, are examples of practices that are becoming firmly established.

Thus, Communist Party leadership of the Armed Forces is an objective law of Soviet military development. Like any social law it is realized through the conscious activity of people. In this case successful realization of the law depends greatly on the efforts and correctly organized work of political organs and party organizations and on the activity of each individual communist, the ability to carry out the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress on defense issues and problems of party building.

The political organs of the Soviet Armed Forces have a great and glorious history. The first central political organ in the Soviet Armed Forces was the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars, called "Vsebyurovoyenkom," formed in 1918. It managed the appointment and activities of military commissars and political and educational work in units and regions where they were formed. V. I. Lenin devoted a great deal of attention to its activities.⁷

In the spring of 1918 political branches began to be formed in divisions, armies, and fronts. The Statute on Political Branches of the revolutionary military councils of the fronts and armies dated 5 December 1918 stated that they were being established "to carry on political (party) and cultural-educational work both within the active Red Army and among the population of the front and adjacent zones."

As conditions changed and the content and scale of party political work among the troops developed later, the functions of the political branches broadened and their structure was refined. An important milestone in building the political organs was the 8th Congress of the

Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), which fixed the fundamental principle of Soviet military development as undivided party leadership of the country's Armed Forces. At the suggestion of V. I. Lenin the congress adopted a decision: "Abolish Vsebyurovovenkom. Establish the Political Branch of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, transferring all the functions of Vsebyurovovenkom to this branch and putting a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party at its head with the rights of a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic."¹ This underlined the direct subordination of the new executive military political organ to the party Central Committee.

The formation of the central army and navy political organ was assigned to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, which established the Political Branch of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic by its order of 18 April 1919 and on 15 May 1919 renamed it the Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.¹¹

The formation of new party organs in the army and navy is inseparably linked with the name of V. I. Lenin and the managing activities of the party Central Committee. A harmonious structure of political organs formed as the result of vigorous, purposeful searching for the best organizational forms. During the years of civil war and foreign intervention political branches were operating in every field force and formation.

The political branches combined party and military administrative functions. This combination of functions was necessitated by extremely strict centralization in army command and control and provided the most effective and reliable implementation of party military policy. The building of the system of political organs in the Armed Forces was an integral part of the overall process of building the army of a socialist state and exercised an enormous influence on building its combat might.

The political organs carried out their management activities in various areas, the most important of which were: management of party organizations; military organizational and agitation-propaganda work among personnel; management of cultural education and publishing activities among the troops. Some idea of the nature and scale of the work of the Political Directorate can be gained from the following figures: between June 1919 and June 1920 the Political Directorate inspected the work of political branches in two fronts, eight armies, and 10 divisions, sent 14,808 political workers to the army, and distributed among the troops and the population 1,667,600 books and booklets, 1,800,000 copies of the magazine *VRASNOARMYETS*, and 1,286,000 news sheets, appeals, and open letters.¹¹

The political Directorate and political organs among the troops played a large part in achieving victory over the enemies of the Soviet Motherland during the years of civil war and foreign intervention.

M. V. Frunze wrote: "The Russian Communist Party is unquestionably the organizer of our victories. This challenge could be met because there was a network of political organs encompassing the army from top to bottom and joining it into a single whole unit, joined by the same attitudes and feelings. Therefore, the honor of organizing the victory also goes to our political organs."¹²

In March 1919 at the 5th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) there was criticism of Trotskyite methods of managing the army and of the "military opposition," which defended vestiges of partisan thinking and opposed building a regular Red Army with strictly centralized management, including management of party political work.

The Central Committee report on party military policy, the statements of delegates, and the resolutions of the congress emphasized that the political branches of the army and navy, cooperating with commissars and party cells, were expected to insure the socialist character of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic and indoctrination of the fighting men in the spirit of communism and that the political branches were executive party organs among the troops working under the direct management of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik).

The 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) in March 1921 acknowledged the need to "preserve the political apparatus of the Red Army in the form which has developed during three years of war."¹⁴ At the same time it pointed out that it would be necessary to strengthen the tie between the party political apparatus and local party organizations and to develop internal party democracy in army party organizations.

During socialist building the Red Army developed along with the entire country. It was fundamentally reorganized and re-equipped on the basis of advances in building the new society. Thus, in just the years 1934-1939 the number of tanks increased 191 percent and the number of aircraft 130 percent while the level of overall mechanization of the army rose 260 percent.¹⁵ Tank and mechanized formations, aviation brigades (and later divisions and corps), task forces of surface and submarine naval forces, and units and subunits of technical troops appeared in the Armed Forces.

In the international situation that had taken shape one of the principal challenges facing the political organs was to insure high troop combat readiness, mobilize personnel to master new combat equipment, continue strengthening party organizations, and intensify their influence on all aspects of troop life and activities. Considerable attention was devoted to indoctrinating military cadres, strengthening military discipline and one-man command, and improving the system of personnel political training. These missions were successfully accomplished by political organs under the direction of the party Central Committee.

In connection with the reorganization and re-equipping of the army and navy the organizational structure of the political organs was also refined. One of the leading areas of change was developing a system of political organs in tank, mechanized, artillery, aviation, and naval formations. The structure of district political directorates changed. Groups formed in them to work in mechanized and tank units and in aviation.

In 1940 the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and the Main Political Directorate of the Navy were converted to main directorates of political propaganda and the political directorates of the districts and fleets became simple directorates of political propaganda. In June 1941, just before the Great Patriotic War, there were 12,200 party cells in the Armed Forces with a total membership of 563,500 communists.¹⁶ Komsomol organizations were active in all subunits and on all ships. There were nearly 2 million Komsomol members in the army and navy in June 1941.¹⁷ The training of political cadres has been a subject of special concern for political organs throughout the history of development of the USSR Armed Forces. A number of military political schools were formed following orders of the Central Committee. The number of political workers in the Worker-Peasant Red Army rose from 15,000 to 34,000 between 1934 and 1939.¹⁸

As a result of changes that occurred in the social structure of our society during socialist building, the constant attention given by the Communist Party to political indoctrination of the fighting men, and the work of party organs in the Red Army and Navy, the moral-political unity of personnel and the solidarity around the party Central Committee and Soviet Government grew stronger.

The courage, steadfastness, loyalty to the socialist Motherland, and large-scale heroism of Soviet fighting men in the fighting at Lake Khassan, on the Khalkhin-Gol River, and on the Karelian Isthmus convincingly demonstrated the effectiveness of the party political work pursued actively and purposefully by the political organs. Accomplishment of the missions of party political work by army and navy political organs in the prewar years was a contribution to laying the foundation of our future victories.

The organizational and ideological-political work of the political organs and party organizations shone especially brightly during the period of harsh trials which befell our people and Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945. "The war imposed on the Soviet Union by German fascism," the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "The 30th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45" (January 1975) stated, "was the largest armed action by the striking forces of world imperialism against socialism and one of the most difficult trials ever endured by our Motherland."¹⁹

After evaluating the threat to our country, the party Central Committee and Soviet Government, in the directive on 29 June 1941 by the USSR

Soviet of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) to party and Soviet organizations in the front regions concerning mobilization of all men and equipment to crush the fascist aggressors, posed the challenge of immediately reorganizing all party activities to fit wartime conditions and, under party leadership mobilizing all forces and means to assist the Red Army and repulse the enemy. The directive expressed unshakable faith in the victory of the Soviet people, who were fighting for a righteous cause.²⁰

The difficult situation and new challenges demanded a reorganization of party political work and a broadening of its scope and influence. This necessitated a reorganization and bolstering of the political organs and a search for the forms and methods of activity which would be most helpful in achieving victory. In July 1941, in conformity with decisions of the party Central Committee and an Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army was made the Main Political Directorate of the Worker-Peasant Red Army. Similar changes took place in the central political organ of the navy.

During the Great Patriotic War 2,000 political organs were active in the army and navy, purposefully carrying out decisions of the party Central Committee and the directives of the State Committee for Defense and the Supreme High Command. The military commissars, an institution which existed from July 1941 until October 1942, played an enormous part in strengthening the Red Army and Navy, increasing troop fighting effectiveness, and improving party political work with personnel during the initial, most difficult period of the war.

At the decision of the Central Committee, prominent party workers with vast experience in organizational and mass political work were assigned to executive military work in the active army, primarily as members of the military councils of fronts and armies.²¹ In the first six months of the war, about 8,405 party executive workers were sent to the Armed Forces on the decision of the party Central Committee.²² Political organs managed the training of military commissars and political instructors right in the units following a special program developed by the Main Political Directorate.

The activities of the political organs to train political cadres, done under the direction of the party Central Committee, provided the troops with trained political workers capable of carrying out the duties assigned to them.

L. I. Brezhnev said, "The political workers were the soul of the Soviet Armed Forces. They carried the word of the party to our fighting men and inspired them to heroic and self-sacrificing struggle. From the political instructor to the member of the Military Council, they were there when things were most difficult, bolstering the men's faith in the triumph of our righteous cause and instilling courage, strength of will, and fearlessness in them."²³ Their principal weapons were

the moving word of the party and their personal example in battle. Political organs deserve considerable credit for the fact that heroism on behalf of the Motherland became the norm of behavior for Soviet fighting men in battle.

The complex challenges of war demanded much greater militancy by party and Komsomol organizations. The substratum of communists in the military service grew steadily throughout the Great Patriotic War. Party organizations actively took in the best fighting men, those who had distinguished themselves in battle. Political organs exercised firm, daily management of army and navy party and Komsomol organizations.

The political organs did an enormous amount of useful work on ideological and a political indoctrination of the fighting men. In every situation, even the most difficult one, the fighting men always heard talks by agitators and propagandists, received current copies of central, front, army, and division newspapers, and kept up to date on the most important political events. The Council on Military Political Propaganda of the Main Political Directorate, which was formed by decision of the party Central Committee in June 1942, made a large contribution to improving mass education and propaganda work.

One of the most important areas of activity of political organs during the Great Patriotic War was insuring a high level of combat skill among army and navy personnel. Political organs worked hard to generalize and introduce combat know-how and experience with party political work among personnel. They took care to maintain the integration of troop training and indoctrination and to develop high moral and fighting qualities in the men and commanders.

Party political work in the army and navy was a powerful means of effecting people's hearts and minds and improving the moral and fighting qualities of the fighting men. In his book "Malaya Zemlya" [Small Land], L. I. Brezhnev wrote that the toughness of the men, their well-organized everyday affairs, concern for conserving the men's strength and health, timely replacements, cheerful jokes in quiet moments, unconditional bravery during the attack, and the fact that people remained people until the end were all results of party political work. Vigorous, multifaceted, and purposeful party political work by political organs in the army and navy was one of the decisive factors in the Soviet people's victory, a victory of world historical importance, in the Great Patriotic War.²⁴

The transition of the Soviet Armed Forces to a peacetime footing gave the political organs new tasks. When the army and navy were joined in a single ministry in 1946, a single Main Political Directorate for the two branches was formed as the directive and organizing body for questions of party political work and enjoyed the rights of a division of the party Central Committee. Since 1958 this organization has been known as the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

With the new conditions and missions of the army and navy in the post-war years, the work of their party organizations has also been revised. The political organs worked toward continued organizational and ideological strengthening of party organizations and insuring that communists have a vanguard role in combat and political training, discipline, and performance of service duty. Improving party education and the system of personnel political training and strengthening the party influence on all aspects of the life and activities of army collectives were important parts of the activities of political organs. High and constant combat readiness in the Soviet Armed Forces became a subject of special attention for the political organs. The institution of deputy *sampson* commanders for political affairs that was introduced in January 1949 helped improve party political work.

The decisions of the October 1957 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee fostered an improvement in party political work under the new conditions of army and navy activity. This plenum again emphasized the Leninist proposition that the principal source of strength of the Soviet Armed Forces is Communist Party management of them. The Plenum pointed out that the military councils, political organs, and party organizations of the army and navy have an important role, alongside the sole commanders, in guaranteeing the security of the socialist state and maintaining our defense capability at the level of contemporary military science and technology.

In the subsequent period a number of important steps were taken on the basis of decisions of the CPSU Central Committee to improve party political work in the army and navy. Higher military political schools were established. A new statute on political organs and new Instructions for CPSU organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy were ratified. All-army conferences of the secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations and ideological workers were held, as were science-practice conferences. All these things helped raise the level of ideological and organizational work by political organs and party organizations and bolster their influence on the effectiveness and quality of combat and political training of Armed Forces personnel.

Historical experience shows unequivocally that the political organs are military organs for the organization of party forces in the army and navy and that they are capable of accomplishing the important missions given to them by the party Central Committee and Soviet Government in all stages of development of the Armed Forces.

Development of the Soviet Armed Forces today is carried forward on the basis of the points of the CPSU Program, decisions of CPSU congresses, decrees of the party Central Committee, and orders of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev. These documents define the challenges of military development on the basis of scientific-technical advances with due regard for our country's international status.

The commanders, political organs, and party organizations are successfully performing the missions given to the Armed Forces by the party and government. They understand that the development of events in the international arena and the significant changes occurring in technical equipment impose steadily higher demands on the Armed Forces. They have special responsibility for the defense of the country. As the USSR Constitution emphasizes, it is their duty to the people to reliably defend our socialist fatherland.²¹

In this connection great and important tasks are given to the army and navy political organs, which search for optimal forms and methods of party political work among the troops, study and summarize useful experience, and raise the level of organizational activity. This process reflects increased purposefulness and concreteness in work to carry out the decisions of the 25th Party Congress and subsequent Plenums of the Central Committee and the orders of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chairman of the USSR Council for Defense, and Marshal of the Soviet Union L. I. Brezhnev. This process is also seen in the consideration given to the specific features of the branches and arms of troops, districts, and fleets in deciding the basic questions on which combat readiness primarily depends: growth in the ideological level and effectiveness of political training for all categories of servicemen; the comprehensive approach to organizing all personnel indoctrination; the increased militancy of party and Komsomol organizations; the successes of socialist competition, and many other things.

The CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "Steps to Improve Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" of January 1967 directed political organs to "solve these problems." Along with other important points, this party document substantiated the new, higher demands being made of military cadres with respect to combat and political training, defined the tasks of political organs under contemporary conditions, and emphasized the need to improve their working style and methods. "The most important condition for successful accomplishment of the missions facing the Armed Forces," it says in the CPSU Central Committee decree of 31 January 1967, "is all out improvement of party political work in the army and navy. The activities of political organs and party organizations should be raised to the level of current party requirements."²²

The political organs consider that modern weapons have a determining influence on the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. These weapons have made significant changes in all areas of military affairs and impose high requirements for preparation of personnel, the decisive force in wartime, concerning level of training, organization, moral-political qualities, psychological strength, and physical endurance.

In their concern for the combat readiness of units and formations, political organs look into all aspects of combat training and troop service, fight against all manifestations of conceit, indifference,

simplification, and improvement in personnel training, and help commanders eliminate shortcomings. The political organs give considerable attention to improving party political work to maintain a high level of field, air, and sea training among personnel and to support and command exercises. The political organs direct socialist competition and mobilize the men to successfully carry out the programs of combat and political training.

Increasing the military and military of primary party organizations is especially important for strengthening the combat readiness of the Armed Forces and improving party political work. A great deal has been done in this direction recently. In conformity with the Statute on Political Organs of the Soviet Army and Navy and the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, the group of army and navy party organizations given the right to monitor administrative activities was broadened. The fifth All-Army meeting of the secretaries of party organizations in March 1973 exercised a strong influence to increase the military of party organizations.²³ In conformity with the recommendations of the meeting, political organs intensified the attention given to internal party work and insuring that communists play a vanguard role.

The exchange of party documents carried out in 1973-1974 provided a new impetus to strengthening party organizations. During the exchange the political organs and party organizations enriched themselves with experience in organizational and political work, the ranks of party organizations became even stronger, their ties with the masses of servicemen were bolstered, and the role of the political organs as executive party organs of the CPSU and the Armed Forces increased.

The party organizations of staffs and directorates have a large part to play in raising the combat readiness of units and formations. The changes taking place in military affairs have also been reflected significantly in the working methods of staffs and led to an enlargement of their role in the command and control system. The challenges of managing the daily training and indoctrination process in the army and navy have become more complex and multifaceted. This requires administrative officers and generals to show great flexibility, precision, and sophistication in their work. The Marxist-Leninist worldview, a broad military outlook, thorough knowledge of the organization of one's own forces and those of the potential enemy and of the combat capabilities and principles of use of modern weapons and equipment, strong will, the ability to assess all efforts and performance of a mission received, and high vigilance — these are the matters to which political agencies are devoting all their efforts as well as the efforts of staff and administrative party organizations.

The political organs begin from Lenin's teachings in improving the style of party political work in administrative bodies. "In order to administer one must be competent. One must know all production conditions fully and exactly; one must know the technology of this production in its highest form. One must have a certain scientific

education."²¹ At the November 1978 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev observed that each element of the administrative apparatus should have a clear picture of its role and place in solving the most important problems.²² Guided by these instructions, political organs are devoting their efforts to establishing an atmosphere of creativity in staffs and administrative collectives, creating an innovative spirit and need to be constantly improving one's knowledge and skills. They are teaching good political and work characteristics.

The authority and militancy of party organizations is determined in large part by the vanguard role of communists in combat and political training and performance of service duties. The July 1978 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee re-emphasized the need to strive to see that every communist sets an example of unselfish labor, skillfully passes on know-how, and shows real concern for the common cause and for establishing an atmosphere of harmonious and creative collective work.²³

The ideological work done by political organs plays an important part in strengthening combat readiness and in accomplishment of all the missions facing our units and formations. In the current phase the content and organization of this work is determined by decisions of the 25th party congress, the new 1958 Constitution, and the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee dealing with ideological issues. The Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th party says: "Contemporary conditions set forth new challenges for party ideological activity. The experience of party organization suggests a way we can take to increase its effectiveness. This is the comprehensive approach to the organization of all indoctrination work, that is, insuring close integration of ideological-political, labor, and moral indoctrination with due regard for the special characteristics of different groups of working people."²⁴ L. I. Brezhnev's book "Aktual'nyye Voprosy Ideologicheskoy Raboty KPSS" [Timely Issues of CPSU Ideological Work] is making a major contribution to defining the tasks and improving the forms and methods of ideological work. This book gives ideological cadres and all communists a knowledge of the goals and special characteristics of CPSU ideological work under contemporary conditions and poses the problems of practical work clearly and accurately.

The political organs are doing a great deal of purposeful work toward ideological-political indoctrination of personnel with due regard for the increased level of education and sophistication among personnel as they carry out the decisions of the 25th party congress and subsequent decrees of the Central Committee. They are raising the level of political activism among servicemen on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, shaping a progressive worldview and ideological convictions in them, and explaining the foreign and domestic policy of the Communist Party and Soviet Government and the superiority of our progressive socialist system.

There is a broad network of universities of Marxism-Leninism, party schools, and study groups in the army and navy. The units and formations have a large number of works by the founders of scientific communism. The officers' and soldiers' clubs and other cultural educational institutions are doing a great deal of indoctrination work with personnel. All this multifaceted activity is being refined constantly in close touch with the missions of combat training and troop indoctrination.

The principal content of ideological work by political organs and party organizations in the army and navy remains propaganda for communist ideals and the Soviet way of life, the new USSR Constitution, and the achievements of developed socialism and firmly establishing in the men's consciousness the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, pride in our Motherland, and readiness to come to the defense of the achievements of socialism.

The characteristics of the current phase of development of the international situation confirm the timeliness of the statement made in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th party congress to the effect that "in the struggle between two world-views there is no place for neutrality and compromises. Here we must have high political vigilance, aggressive, operational, and persuasive propaganda work, and a timely rebuff to hostile ideological moves."¹ Guided by this statement, political organs are working hard to indoctrinate personnel in a spirit of high political vigilance. They are giving the servicemen a correct understanding of the international situation and the class character of the ideological struggle that has developed and they expose the falseness of hostile propaganda.

Questions of moral indoctrination of personnel occupy a prominent place in the work of the political organs and party organizations. The science-practice conferences held in the units and formations on the topic "Formation of an Active Posture in Life — Experience with and Timely Problems of Moral Indoctrination" are devoted to these matters, to give an example. The principal thing in moral indoctrination is to improve its effectiveness and insure that word and deed are organically combined, that there is a living example. The practical importance of this combination is shown clearly in L. I. Brezhnev's books "Malaya Zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" [Resurrection], and "Tselina" [The Virgin Land], which are exceptionally important for the moral-political conditioning of communists and all fighting men.

The advances of military pedagogy and psychology and the results of concrete sociological research are used extensively by political organs today to raise the level of ideological-political and moral indoctrination and the effectiveness of ideological work. In this connection political organs are trying to see that all officers have thorough knowledge of the fundamentals of the theory of the indoctrination process. They are devoting considerable attention to working

out scientifically substantiated recommendations to improve party political work.

Political organs are increasingly considering the expanded international missions of our army and navy in their work and devote great attention to strengthening the fraternal friendship of the USSR Armed Forces with the armies of the countries of the socialist community and to international indoctrination of Soviet fighting men.

The political organs and party organizations represent a great force in the army and navy. Together with the sole commanders they work energetically to improve the quality of combat training, raise combat readiness and organization, strengthen conscious military discipline, and achieve teamwork in the work of all elements of the army and navy collectives. While performing these missions political organs and party organizations improve the forms and methods of party political work. The arsenal of organizational and ideological means that promote an increase in the effectiveness of all activities, a strengthening of party ranks, development of internal party democracy, and incorporation of the Leninist style of work is becoming noticeably broader and more varied.

Guided by Marxist-Leninist science concerning the defense of the socialist Fatherland, the decisions of the CPSU, and the orders of its Central Committee, our political organs are successfully accomplishing their missions which arise from the requirements of the new USSR Constitution and making a worthy contribution to the Soviet Armed Forces' performance of their sacred duty: reliable defense of our Motherland and of all the fraternal countries of the socialist community.

FOOTNOTES

1. See KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL 1969, No 12, p 3.
2. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuz" [The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1969, p 35 (documents from 1917-1968).
3. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuz" [Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics], Moscow, 1977, p 6.
4. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 40, pp 76-77.
5. Ibid, Vol 39, p 56.
6. See "Ustav Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [By-Laws of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1978, p 67.
7. See, for example, "Leninskiy Sbornik XXXIV" [Lenin Anthology XXXIV], p 68.

8. "Partiyno-Politicheskaya Rabota v Krasnoy Armii (Aprel' 1918 - Fevral' 1919)" [Party Political Work in the Red Army (April 1918 - February 1919)], Moscow, 1961, pp 92-93, (documents).
9. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh ..." op. cit., p 48.
10. See "Partiyno-Politicheskaya Rabota v Krasnoy Armii. Mart 1919 - 1920" [Party Political Work in the Red Army. March 1919-1920], Moscow, 1964, p 40, (documents).
11. See "V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" [V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces], Moscow, 1969, p 140.
12. Frunze, M. V., "Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Vol 2, Moscow, 1957, pp 121-122.
13. See "Vos'moy S'yezd RKP(b). Mart 1919 Goda" [The Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). March 1919], Moscow, 1959, pp 417, 121-422, (records of proceedings).
14. "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh S'yezdov, Konferentsiy i Plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and Plenums of the Central Committee], Vol 2, Moscow, 1970, p 263.
15. See "XVIII S'yezd Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii (b). 10-21 Marta 1939 g." [The 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party. 10-21 March 1939], Moscow, 1939, pp 193-194, 196, (stenographic report).
16. See "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II], Vol 3, Moscow, 1974, p 432.
17. Ibid.
18. See "XVIII S'yezd ..." op. cit., p 200.
19. "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh ..." op. cit., Vol 11, Moscow, 1978, p 507.
20. See Ibid, Vol 6, Moscow, 1971, pp 17-19.
21. See "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Vol 5, Book 1, Moscow, 1970, p 169.
22. Ibid, p 171.
23. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim Kursom. Rech'i i Stat'i" [By a Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 1, Moscow, 1970, pp 131-132.
24. Brezhnev, L. I., "Malaya Zemlya" [Small Land], Moscow, 1978, pp 23-24.

25. See "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh ..." op. cit., Vol 7, Moscow, 1971, pp 295-297.
26. See "Konstitutsiya ..." op. cit., p 31.
27. See "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh ..." op. cit., p 414.
28. Ibid, p 415.
29. See KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL 1973, No 8, p 9.
30. Ibid.
31. Lenin, V. I., op. cit., Vol 40, p 215.
32. See KOMMUNIST 1978, No 17, p 13.
33. Brezhnev, L. I., "O Dal'neyshem Razvitii Sel'skogo Khozyaystva SSSR. Doklad na Plenum TsK KPSS 3 Yulya 1978 g. Postanovleniye Plenuma TsK KPSS 4 Yulya 1978 g" [Further Development of Agriculture. Report at the 3 July 1978 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Decree of the 4 July 1978 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee], Moscow, 1978, pp 41-46.
34. "XXV S'yezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza 24 Fevralya - 5 Marta 1976 g." [The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 24 February - 5 March 1976], Vol 1, Moscow, 1976, p 100, (stengraphic report).
35. Ibid, p 99.

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